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Abstract 
 
This thesis is a contribution to the foundations of space-time theories. It examines the 
proper understanding of the Newtonian and 1905 inertial frame concepts and the critical 
analysis of these concepts that was motivated by the equivalence principle. This is the 
hypothesis that it is impossible to distinguish locally between a homogeneous 
gravitational field and a uniformly accelerated frame. 
 
The three essays that comprise this thesis address, in one way or another, the 
criteria through which the inertial frame concepts are articulated. They address the place 
of these concepts in the conceptual framework of physics and their significance for our 
understanding of space and time. 
 
In Chapter 2, I examine two claims that arise in Brown’s (2005) account of 
inertia. Brown claims there is something objectionable about the way in which the 
motions of free particles in Newtonian theory and special relativity are coordinated. 
Brown also claims that since a geodesic principle can be derived in Einsteinian 
gravitation the objectionable feature is explained away. I argue that there is nothing 
objectionable about inertia and that, while the theorems that motivate Brown’s claim can 
be said to figure in a deductive-nomological explanation, their main contribution lies in 
their explication rather than their explanation of inertial motion. 
 
In Chapter 3, I examine Friedman’s recent approach to the analysis of physical 
theories (2001; 2010a; 2010b; 2011). Friedman argues that the identification of certain 
principles as ‘constitutive’ is essential to the correct methodological analysis of physics. I 
explicate Friedman’s characterisation of a constitutive principle and his account of the 
constitutive principles that Newtonian and Einsteinian gravitation presuppose for their 
formulation. I argue that something very close to Friedman’s view is defensible. 
 
In Chapter 4, I examine the so-called background-independence that Einsteinian 
gravitation is said to exemplify. This concept has figured in the work of Rovelli (2001; 
2004), Smolin (2006), Giulini (2007), and Belot (2011), among others. I propose three 
ways of fixing the extension of background-independence, and I argue that there is 
something chimaerical about the concept. I argue, however, that there is a proposal that 
clarifies the feature of Einsteinian gravitation that motivates the concept. 
 
 
 
Keywords: inertial frames; Newtonian gravitation; equivalence principle; geodesic 
principle; general relativity; background-independence; structure of space-time theories; 
theory change; methodology 
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Chapter 1 
 
Introduction 
 
This thesis consists of three essays. Each essay examines a view that has been defended 
by a recent interpreter of relativity. The essays share a concern with the proper 
understanding of the Newtonian and 1905 inertial frame concepts and the critical analysis 
of these concepts that was motivated by an insight Einstein had in 1907. That insight has 
been called ‘the equivalence principle,’ and it is the hypothesis that it is impossible to 
distinguish locally between a homogeneous gravitational field and a uniformly 
accelerated frame.1 
 
The equivalence principle motivated what I call ‘the 1907 inertial frame concept’ 
and, with it, a framework of investigation in which Einstein could construct his 
gravitation theory. The concept applies to the state of motion of a reference frame that 
falls freely. That is to say, the frame is subject only to gravitation and has no other 
component of acceleration; for example, it has no component of rotation. In a sufficiently 
local and homogeneous region of space-time, such a frame is indistinguishable from an 
inertial frame in special relativity. 
 
The inertial frame concepts at issue—Newtonian, 1905, 1907—arise in Newton’s 
and Einstein’s theories. These theories provide a framework of constraints for theories of 
special systems such as perfect fluids or gravitation. These ‘framework-theories’ are 
founded on general principles of nature that physical processes satisfy and that motivate 
                                                
1In my discussion of the principle, I have drawn heavily on the treatments of Anderson (1967) and Ehlers 
(1973); and there are still other ways of characterising the equivalence principle. See, e.g., the taxonomy of 
Will (1993). Nonetheless, when I write ‘the equivalence principle,’ I am referring to Einstein’s insight of 
1907 that it is impossible to distinguish locally between a homogeneous gravitational field and a uniformly 
accelerated frame. This principle has been called ‘Einstein’s equivalence principle’ or ‘the 1907 
equivalence principle,’ and it is an interpretive extrapolation from what Anderson, Ehlers, and Will would 
call ‘the principle of the universality of free fall’ or ‘the weak equivalence principle.’ While the principles 
of Anderson, Ehlers, and Will are formulated in the context of Einstein’s completed theory of gravitation, 
the 1907 equivalence principle is situated in the context of theory construction. Isolating it is important for 
understanding the identification of inertial frames and freely falling ones that was crucial to Einstein’s 
construction of his gravitation theory. 
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mathematically formulated criteria.2 These criteria enable us to articulate theoretical 
concepts such as force, mass, acceleration, rotation, and simultaneity; and through the 
articulation of these concepts, they bear on the decomposition of motions into their 
inertial and non-inertial components. In this way, the inertial frame concepts are tied to 
the development of the general principles. These essays examine the general principles 
and the criteria these suggest—their provision, their methodological function, their place 
in an account of the structure of theories. The essays share, moreover, a preoccupation 
with the geometric objects whose application the criteria control, in particular, with the 
transition from those geometric objects peculiar to Newtonian theory and special 
relativity to those peculiar to Einsteinian gravitation. 
 
Each essay takes as its starting point the Newtonian inertial frame concept, and it 
is helpful to review some of the early history of that concept. This will bring to light a 
few turning-points and features that remain with us, and will situate the essays in a 
broader tradition. 
 
1.1. Groundwork for a perturbative analysis of motion 
If one wanted to go very far back, one could begin with the concept of natural 
motion. Its history is well documented, from Aristotle and the Epicureans, the early and 
later impetus theorists, to the Early Moderns. But those episodes that I will emphasise 
concern the recognition of a concept of uniform motion that began in the seventeenth 
century. This concept provided the groundwork for a perturbative analysis of motion, one 
that could serve as the basis for a theory by which interactions in a physical system could 
be both observed and measured. Three figures should be singled out: Galileo, Huyghens, 
and Newton. 
 
Galileo was the first to formulate a number of interrelated concepts that are 
essential to the analysis of a system of bodies in motion. They arise in his Dialogue 
                                                
2This sketch of a distinction between theories that provide a general framework for physics and specific 
theories constructed within such a framework is drawn from Einstein’s (1919 [2002]) distinction between 
principle and constructive theories, but informed by the interpretations of Flores (1999) and DiSalle (2006; 
2012), the latter informed by Demopoulos (1974) and Bub (2005). 
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Concerning the Two Chief World Systems (1632 [1967]). While the Dialogue covered a 
great deal of contemporary science, these concepts are articulated in the passages directed 
against the conception of motion peculiar to the Aristotelian and Ptolemaic systems. 
Aristotle defended a concept of ‘natural motion,’ which he understood with reference to 
‘natural place.’ In the terrestrial realm, the four earthly elements—earth, air, fire, water—
move in straight lines towards their natural places unless they are hindered. For example, 
since smoke is mostly air it moves naturally towards the sky, but not as high as fire; and 
heavy bodies move naturally towards the centre of the universe. Aristotle held that 
objects deviate from their natural motions only when forced, and then only while the 
force is being applied. In this way, he drew a distinction between natural and unnatural or 
forced motions. In the celestial realm, the heavenly bodies move through the 
incorruptible aether, and so move perfectly and eternally in the celestial spheres around 
the stationary Earth. (Physics IV, 1; On the heavens I, 2) 
 
In the Dialogue, Simplicio is an Aristotelian proponent of the geocentric 
hypothesis; Sagredo is an intelligent and initially neutral layman; and Galileo’s 
spokesman is Salviati. Their debate is over the geocentric and heliocentric hypotheses. 
Simplicio gives an argument, now known as ‘the tower argument,’ to undermine 
Copernicus’ heliocentric hypothesis that the Earth makes diurnal rotations about its axis 
and annual revolutions around the stationary Sun. This argument is directed at the claim 
that the Earth makes diurnal rotations: 
 
For, if [the Earth] made the diurnal rotation, a tower from whose top a rock was 
let fall, being carried by the whirling of the earth, would travel many hundreds of 
yards to the east in the time the rock would consume in its fall, and the rock ought 
to strike the earth that distance away from the base of the tower. (Galileo, 1632 
[1967], p. 126) 
 
Salviati points out that the argument begs the question of the rock’s vertical motion. He 
challenges the assumption that the vertical motion of the rock, from the top of the tower 
to the ground, cannot be composed with another motion, the circular motion described by 
the tower. He argues that the rock participates in the motion of the Earth and stays with 
the tower. That is to say, the motion of a falling rock is ‘not straight at all, but mixed 
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straight-and-circular.’ (Galileo, 1632 [1967], p. 248) The principle that underlies the fact 
that the rock stays with the tower has been called the principle of the composition of 
motions. 
 
The composition of motions is a significant insight. It motivates a critical analysis 
of the Aristotelian idea that terrestrial bodies move in straight lines towards their natural 
places unless they are hindered. The new concept of natural motion that is revealed in this 
analysis can be summarised in a principle of uniform circular motion: A body perseveres 
in its state of being at rest or of moving in uniform circular motion unless it is disturbed. 
We find in Galileo, therefore, the first clear recognition of a state of uniform motion 
relative to which other motions can be referred. 
 
The Galilean composition of motions—in particular, the idea that each component 
of a motion is fully realised—represents a significant break with the Aristotelian intuition 
that the motions of terrestrial bodies must oppose one another. Simplicio opposes the idea 
that the observation statement ‘the stone is falling straight down’ should be reinterpreted 
in light of the new concept of composition that Salviati is defending. Salviati tries to 
convince him of the composition of motions by showing him that it is already implicitly 
in use. He proceeds to explicate the concept by taking a familiar example of composed 
motion that goes unnoticed: Sailors below deck in a large, moving ship notice that smoke 
from burnt incense does not move backwards, behind the ship, but rises in a column in 
the same way that it would at the dock; the motion of the smoke is composed with the 
motion of the ship. Likewise, jumping in place aboard the moving ship does not result in 
the ship passing underneath; the motion of the person jumping is composed with the 
motion of the ship. The enclosed cabin of the ship can be generalised to any space in 
sufficiently uniform motion for accelerations to be undetected, one furthermore that 
permits the geometrical description of the motions of the bodies among themselves.3 
Such a space can be called a reference frame. With this concept, the lesson of the ship 
can be summarised in the Galilean relativity principle: Given a system of bodies in a 
                                                
3From a retrospective point of view, we might say that such a space is sufficiently local, homogeneous, and 
isotropic, one furthermore in which an accelerometer would detect no acceleration. 
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reference frame, their motions relative to one another are the same whether the frame is at 
rest or moving uniformly.4 The notions of a reference frame and a relativity principle, 
when they are taken together, determine an equivalence class of reference frames in 
uniform motion. 
 
Having convinced Simplicio that the principle of the composition of motions is 
already implicitly in use, Salviati proceeds to convince him that, in virtue of the principle, 
a rock dropped from the mast of a moving ship would not be left behind but would fall at 
the base of the mast. He then argues that the principle applies just as well to the tower as 
to the ship. The motion of the rock falling from the tower and the motion of the rock 
falling from the mast are both instances of composed motion: 
 
transfer this argument [the ship argument] to the whirling of the earth 
and to the rock placed on top of the tower, whose motion you cannot 
discern because, in common with the rock, you possess from the earth 
that motion which is required for following the tower; you do not need 
to move your eyes. Next, if you add to the rock a downward motion 
which is peculiar to it and not shared by you, and which is mixed with 
this circular motion, the circular portion of the motion which is 
common to the stone and the eye continues to be imperceptible. The 
straight motion alone is sensible, for to follow that you must move your 
eyes downwards. (Galileo, 1632 [1967], p. 250) 
 
Salviati’s essential point in all of these arguments is this: The fact that the rock falls at the 
base of the tower does not establish anything either way; it does not undermine the 
argument that the rock’s motion is ‘mixed straight-and-circular.’ What emerges from the 
dialogue is that the concepts of composed motion and uniform circular motion, far from 
being radical, are in fact already implicitly in use.5 
 
Setting aside Galileo’s goal of defending the Copernican hypothesis, what is of 
greatest interest to us is his recognition of a number of interrelated concepts. We find in 
                                                
4Galileo’s clearest statement of his principle can be found in the ‘Second Day’ of the Dialogue (1632 
[1967], p. 187). This statement of Galileo’s relativity principle is close to Newton’s Corollary V to the laws 
of motion (Newton, 1726 [1999], p. 423). It differs in that it makes no mention of rectilinearity. Note also 
that, for Galileo, the principle is an independent principle; for Newton, it is a consequence of the laws. 
5To emphasise the Socratic aspect of the Dialogue, one could say that these concepts already reside within 
us––within Simplicio and Sagredo—and we are brought by anamnesis—by Salviati’s midwifery—to 
recollect them. 
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‘the tower argument’ the principle of the composition of motions and the principle of 
uniform circular motion. We find in ‘the ship argument’ the first clear notions of a 
reference frame, a relativity principle, and an equivalence class of reference frames. 
What Galileo recognised, in sum, is the concept of a reference frame in a privileged state 
of motion, one relative to which we can give a satisfactory description of the motions 
among the bodies. 
 
While the debate over the geocentric and heliocentric hypotheses continued, the 
mechanical philosophers focused on the more specific, though related, problem of giving 
a proper analysis of collisions. Huyghens understood certain aspects of the relativity of 
motion better perhaps than any of his contemporaries, and certainly better than Descartes 
and Leibniz.6 He saw clearly that place, rest, motion, velocity, and acceleration are all 
relative to some arrangement of bodies taken as a reference—to a table, e.g., on whose 
surface a number of balls are rolling. He recognised that velocity-difference and not 
absolute velocity is an objectively measurable quantity. This is especially clear in his 
analysis of rotation. Rotation might appear to stand apart from other relative motions 
since in involves no change of position. But Huyghens recognised that rotation is not 
absolute but a species of relative motion; it is peculiar because it is a property of a system 
of particles—the smallest rotating body must have at least two points with different 
velocities. Thus, rotation amounts to the relative velocity of the two points. 
 
On the surface, Huyghens shared with Descartes and Leibniz the view that all 
motions are relative. But where Descartes and Leibniz defended confused and sweeping 
accounts of relative motion—accounts on which any state of motion is essentially as good 
as any other for saying which bodies are in motion and which at rest—Huyghens 
recognised that determining places and velocities, accelerations and rotations, implicitly 
depends on a privileged state of uniform rectilinear motion relative to which they can be 
referred. Huyghens saw clearly that such a state of motion is needed for a satisfactory 
                                                
6My discussion of Huyghens follows closely that of Stein (1967; 1977), who has translated previously 
unpublished fragments of Huyghens, and DiSalle (2006). 
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description of motion and for analysing the exchange of a ‘quantity of motion’ or 
momentum in collisions. 
 
In Principia (1726 [1999]), Newton took the concept of a reference frame in 
uniform rectilinear motion and generalised it to comprehend any frame relative to which 
accelerations can be understood as the result of the action of some force. Newton’s laws 
of motion express criteria for applying the concept of force, and they allowed Newton to 
distinguish uniform rectilinear motion or inertial motion from accelerated or forced 
motion. The first law of motion or principle of inertia defines this relation between 
motion and force: 
 
Every body perseveres in its state of being at rest or of moving uniformly straight 
forward, except insofar as it is compelled to change its state by forces impressed. 
(Newton, 1726 [1999], p. 416) 
 
With the principle, we have moved beyond a merely kinematical notion of a reference 
frame—a frame sufficient for a geometrical description of motion without any appeal to 
causes—to a new one that is inseparable from Newton’s account of force. 
 
But Newton’s account of inertial motion does not end with the statement of the 
first law: The third law of motion is essential to that account—a point I will examine in 
detail in Chapter 1. When they are taken together, Newton’s laws identify a privileged 
class of dynamically equivalent reference frames satisfying Galileo’s relativity principle. 
In any such frame, forces and masses, accelerations and rotations, have the same 
measured values. However, much as these frames are empirically indistinguishable, for 
Newton, they were not theoretically equivalent: Newton thought of them as moving with 
various velocities relative to what he called ‘absolute space,’ even though those velocities 
cannot be known. 
 
Though ‘absolute space’ was a technical term in Newton’s theory, and so departs 
from the established meaning, many of his contemporaries understood it to invoke a 
metaphysical thesis and criticised its introduction on philosophical grounds. It was not 
until the nineteenth century that Newton’s theory was given its proper form by the insight 
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into its complete independence from the notion of absolute space in the work of 
Neumann (1870), Thomson (1884), Lange (1885), and others.7 Following this work, the 
content of the laws of motion can be summarised: Given a system of particles in motion, 
there exists a reference frame and a time-scale relative to which every acceleration is 
proportional to and in the direction of the force applied, and where every such force 
belongs to an action-reaction pair.8 
 
The laws of motion so understood give rise to the inertial frame concept that 
Einstein subjected to a critical analysis, in two stages. In the 1905 paper, Einstein argued 
from the nineteenth-century concept to a new one motivated by an electrodynamical 
principle. The new concept to which the nineteenth-century one gave way is this: An 
inertial frame is not merely one in uniform rectilinear motion but one in which light 
travels equal distances in equal times in arbitrary directions. It was this concept of motion 
that Einstein subjected to a critical analysis in 1907 through his insight—what is often 
called ‘the equivalence principle’—that it is impossible to distinguish locally between a 
homogeneous gravitational field and a uniformly accelerated frame. The equivalence 
principle motivates the critical analysis of the 1905 concept precisely because classical 
inertial frames cannot be distinguished locally from freely falling ones.9 
 
My project examines three disputed ideas that are bound up with this last episode. 
It examines a recent account of the classical inertial frame concept; it examines an 
account of the equivalence principle; and it examines an alleged methodological lesson of 
the revision of the background-structure peculiar to Newtonian theory and special 
relativity. 
 
1.2. Brief outline 
In Chapter 2, I examine two claims that arise in Harvey Brown’s account of 
inertial motion in Physical Relativity (2005). Brown claims there is something 
                                                
7Other notable contributors include Mach (1883 [1919]), Muirhead (1887), and MacGregor (1893). 
8This formulation is close to those of Thomson (1884, p. 387) and Muirhead (1887, pp. 479-480). 
9It is noteworthy that this critical analysis can be applied separately to the Newtonian and 1905 inertial 
frame concepts, since, independently of electrodynamics, Newtonian forces look the same in freely falling 
frames (cf. Corollary VI to the Laws of Motion). 
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objectionable about the way in which the motions of free particles in Newtonian theory 
and special relativity are coordinated. This claim implies that inertia requires an 
explanation since the coordination is postulated not explained. Brown also claims that 
since a geodesic principle can be derived as a theorem in Einsteinian gravitation the 
objectionable feature of Newtonian theory and special relativity is explained away. I take 
issue with both claims. I argue that there is nothing objectionable about inertia and that, 
while the theorems that motivate Brown’s claim can be said to figure in a deductive-
nomological explanation, their main contribution lies in their explication rather than their 
explanation of inertial motion. 
 
In Chapter 3, I examine Friedman’s recent approach to the analysis of physical 
theories (2001; 2010a; 2010b; 2011). Friedman argues against Quine that the 
identification of certain principles as ‘constitutive’ is essential to the correct 
methodological analysis of physics. I explicate Friedman’s characterisation of a 
constitutive principle and his account of the constitutive principles that Newtonian and 
Einsteinian gravitation presuppose for their formulation. I argue that something very 
close to Friedman’s view is defensible. 
 
In Chapter 4, I examine the so-called background-independence that Einsteinian 
gravitation is said to exemplify. A number of physicists and philosophers of physics, 
notably Rovelli (2001; 2004) and Smolin (2006), have taken this background-
independence to be an insight about nature that ought to be preserved in a future theory, 
and they take the pursuit of background-independent approaches to quantum gravity to be 
a good heuristic. I ask: What is this sought-after background-independence? What is the 
concept at stake here? I propose three ways of fixing the extension of background-
independence, and I argue that there is something chimaerical about the concept. I argue, 
however, that there is a proposal for background-independence that clarifies the feature of 
Einsteinian gravitation that is the basis for nearly all proposals for background-
independence. 
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In Chapter 5, I conclude with a brief discussion of two notions of apriority that 
run through the essays. I outline a way of extending this project in future work. 
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Chapter 2 
 
There is no conspiracy of inertia 
 
1. Introduction 
Conceptual analysis, at least in the analytic tradition since Frege, is the practice of 
identifying central features of a concept by revealing the assumptions on which use of the 
concept depends.10 This approach to conceptual analysis has also been a part of the 
foundations of physics, at least since Newton. Conceptual analysis in physics is 
responsible to the body of theory and practice in which the concept is situated and in 
which it is interconnected with other concepts both physical and mathematical. The 
identification and explication of these connections, therefore, is a main objective of an 
analysis. 
 
There is, however, an older tradition in which conceptual analysis does not 
proceed in this way; concepts are explicated through metaphysical and methodological 
enquiry. The intuitions that drive this kind of enquiry are held to bear decisively on the 
analysis of physical theories and the concepts they comprise. This tradition, at least so far 
as the theory of space and time is concerned, is exemplified in certain arguments offered 
by Leibniz, Huyghens, Berkeley, Mach, and Einstein.11 This is not to say that these 
thinkers did not also pursue conceptual analysis in the sense characteristic of the analytic 
tradition, but their most famous and influential criticisms of Newton’s theory reflect 
underlying conceptions of substance, action, and causality that are alleged to be known 
independently of physics. These conceptions, furthermore, are bound up with views about 
how knowledge of the structure of the world is gained, about the nature of scientific 
explanation, and about what an empirical theory may legitimately postulate. Brown’s 
Physical Relativity (2005) belongs to this tradition, and those claims that I will examine 
are motivated by a number of intuitions about inertial motion that have their source in 
Einstein. Like Einstein, Brown holds that there is something objectionable about inertial 
                                                
10This way of expressing the basic idea of conceptual analysis is due to Demopoulos (2000, p. 220). 
11This is not to say that Newton’s views on space, time, and motion are free of philosophical intuitions. But 
Newton stands out among these thinkers for offering principles that constitute these concepts independently 
of any philosophical intuitions one may have about them. In this way, he ensures that the concepts are 
insulated from such intuitions, even his own. 
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motion in Newtonian theory and special relativity. He calls the objectionable feature ‘the 
conspiracy of inertia,’ and he claims that the conspiracy is explained away by Einstein’s 
theory of gravitation.12 
 
In this essay, I will examine Brown’s account of inertial motion in Newtonian 
theory and special relativity. I will argue against the allegation of a conspiracy, and I will 
argue that, while there is a sense in which Einsteinian gravitation explains inertial motion, 
the main contribution of the theorems that motivate Brown’s claim lies in their 
explication rather than their explanation of inertial motion. 
 
2. The alleged conspiracy 
There is a view that can be found in Einstein (e.g., 1922 [1950]; 1924 [1991]) and 
Nerlich (1976) according to which space-time structure explains the motion of free 
particles. Free particles and light rays move along the ‘ruts’ and ‘grooves’ of the affine 
geodesics of space-time, much as trains run along tracks. As Nerlich (1976, p. 264) has 
put it, it is ‘because space-time has a certain shape that worldlines lie as they do.’ On this 
view, there is a causal inference from space-time structure to the phenomena of motion. 
This view is sometimes called ‘the space-time explanation’ or ‘the causal-explanatory 
view.’ 
 
Brown’s account of space-time structure is set against this view. Brown argues 
that space-time structure is determined by the equivalence-class structure of some 
particular dynamical theory; for example, the equivalence-class structures determined by 
Newtonian mechanics or Maxwell’s theory. Einsteinian gravitation differs from these 
theories because it has no symmetry group. More precisely, it has no non-trivial 
symmetries; its symmetries are expressed by the invariance of the geometric objects on 
the manifold under arbitrary diffeomorphisms. Nonetheless, elements of space-time 
structure are coordinated to the world of experience by an empirical criterion, namely, the 
                                                
12These claims are separable from the principal claim of Physical Relativity, namely, that length contraction 
and clock retardation are in need of a dynamical explanation, and that such an explanation must come from 
a ‘constructive theory,’ that is, a theory of the forces of cohesion that maintain a body’s configuration. This 
view has been criticised by Norton (2008), Hagar (2008), Janssen (2009), and DiSalle (2012). 
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strong equivalence principle. With the equivalence principle, approximately geodesic 
trajectories can be coordinated with free particles. In all of these theories, therefore, 
space-time structure is a codification of certain important features of physical processes. 
Or, to put it the other and perhaps more familiar way, certain important features of 
physical processes can be represented by certain elements of space-time structure. 
 
While Brown’s view is significant for its rejection of the space-time explanation 
account, it has another aspect that is just as problematic as the latter view.13 For Brown, 
Newtonian theory and special relativity commit us to accepting something questionable, 
which he illustrates with the metaphor of a conspiracy among the free particles of the 
universe. The metaphor can be found in a number of passages, of which the following 
four are representative: 
 
Inertia, before Einstein’s general theory of relativity, was a miracle. I ... mean the 
... postulate that force-free (henceforth free) bodies conspire to move in straight 
lines at uniform speeds while being unable, by fiat, to communicate with each 
other. (Brown, 2005, pp. 14-15) 
 
A kind of highly non-trivial pre-established harmony is being postulated, and it 
takes the form of the claim that there exists a coordinate system xµ and parameters 
τ such that [d2xµ/dτ2 = 0] holds for each and every free particle in the universe. 
(Brown, 2005, p. 17) 
 
... there is a prima facie mystery as to why objects with no antennae should move 
in an orchestrated fashion. That is precisely the pre-established harmony, or 
miracle, that was highlighted above. (Brown, 2005, p. 24) 
 
... force-free particles have no antennae ... they are unaware of the existence of 
other particles. That is the prima facie mystery of inertia in pre-GR theories: how 
do all the free particles of the world know how to behave in a mutually 
coordinated way such that their motion appears extremely simple from the point 
of view of a family of privileged frames? (Brown, 2005, p. 142) 
 
I propose the following as a synthesis of these and other passages that exemplify what I 
call 
 
Brown’s alleged conspiracy: As a matter of definition, the free particles of the 
universe are non-interacting, and thus cannot detect other objects or even 
                                                
13See also DiSalle (1995; 2006a) for a critique of the space-time explanation account. 
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determine whether there are any.14 Yet, they seem to move in a mutually 
coordinated way. How do they know to move in the way that they do? Newtonian 
theory and special relativity commit us to thinking that there is a conspiracy 
among them. These theories assert that there exists a coordinate system xµ and 
parameters τ associated with each particle such that the equation d2xµ/dτ2 = 0 
holds. 
 
To put the idea another way, one could say that the free particles of the universe agree not 
to accelerate and to follow geodesics of the space-time. Also, particles that are 
themselves composites must satisfy the conservation of momentum; that is, the forces 
among the constituent particles must be balanced, failing which the particle, by its 
internal forces, will accelerate without limit. Therefore, one could say that free particles 
must also conspire to maintain a state of equilibrium.15 I will address this in detail in §5. 
 
To take the metaphor of a pre-established harmony rather than a conspiracy, one 
could say that free particles are predetermined to move such that certain geometrical 
relations among them hold; specifically, such that the function describing the distances 
between them is of a certain fixed form. One could say that every free particle has as part 
of its complete notion that its motion will be such that the distance function holds. That 
is, its correspondence with other particles belongs to its complete notion and to theirs. 
 
                                                
14Note that we are considering here only the framework of the laws of motion. In Newtonian gravitation, 
there is an interaction among all of the particles of the universe; every particle attracts every other with a 
force that is proportional to the product of their masses and inversely proportional to the square of the 
distance between them. 
15Though the alleged conspiracy may be understood completely in these terms, it is worth noting that, for 
Brown, there must be more than four free particles for there to be a conspiracy. This idea is motivated by a 
Lange-style path-construction proposed by Pfister (2004). Pfister defines the rectilinear aspect of an 
inertial system in terms of a path-structure in projective geometry. Let three free particles emanate from an 
event such that they follow straight paths p, p′, p′′ that are non-collinear. Choose arbitrary points A, B on p, 
A′, B′ on p′, and so on. Then, e1 is the point at which the paths AA′ and BB′ cross, e2 that at which AA′′ and 
BB′′ cross, and e3 that at which A′A′′ and B′B′′ cross. The path e1e2e3 is part of the structure so constructed. 
These four paths define the rectilinear aspect of an inertial system. But, relative to such a construction, all 
other free particles will move on straight lines. 
While four particles are necessary to define the rectilinear aspect of an inertial system, this 
projective structure alone is not sufficient; it cannot satisfy the requirement that a body’s motion be uniform 
with respect to time as well as rectilinear. The requirement that motion be uniform with respect to time 
means that a body traverses equal distances in equal times. To give an account of equal distances in equal 
times we must define affine and metrical structures. Only in this way do we obtain the necessary notions of 
parallelism and distance. While Brown’s discussion of Pfister’s construction goes part of the way towards 
explicating the mathematical requirements for inertia, it distracts from what really underlies the alleged 
conspiracy, namely, a preoccupation with absolute or global space-time structures. 
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It is worth noting the awkwardness of the conspiracy metaphor. Free particles 
seem to conspire in spite of the fact that they cannot communicate. This, presumably, is 
what is ‘miraculous.’ But, pressing on with the conspiracy metaphor, one could still ask 
why the particles are prohibited from conspiring to move according to some law; for 
example, a law relating their motion to the distribution of mass-energy.16 Perhaps the 
metaphor of a pre-established harmony is more apt. 
 
There may be better metaphors or better ways of fleshing out the existing ones 
with the relevant physics. But, in what follows, I am less concerned with the metaphors 
themselves than with the idea that any such metaphors—any negative metaphors—are 
appropriate at all. I will argue that the allegation of a conspiracy is driven by a number of 
metaphysical and methodological intuitions that obscure rather than clarify inertial 
motion in Newtonian theory and special relativity. 
 
3. The conspirators unmasked 
Brown’s view belongs to a tradition according to which Einsteinian gravitation is 
superior to its predecessors not only because it is an empirically more successful theory 
of gravitation but also because of its ability to satisfy general philosophical and 
methodological principles or preferences. His view, though set against the causal-
explanatory theory of space-time, is still reminiscent of Einstein’s view of Newtonian 
theory and special relativity. I will consider a number of philosophical and 
methodological principles that bear this out, and that seem to motivate the allegation of a 
conspiracy. 
 
3.1. The action-reaction principle 
The most notable of these philosophical principles is found in Einstein’s view that 
inertial systems in Newtonian theory and special relativity are ‘factitious causes’ of 
inertial effects. This is exemplified in Einstein’s (1916 [1952]) illustration involving two 
bodies S1 and S2 in relative rotation. S1 is perfectly spherical while S2 bulges at the 
                                                
16Or, pressing the conspiracy metaphor further, do free particles conspire or is it the ‘parts of space’ that 
conspire to have certain symmetries? 
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equator in the manner of a body subject to a centrifugal force. Einstein asks for the 
explanation of the difference between these bodies, and he replies: 
 
Newtonian mechanics does not give a satisfactory answer to this question. It 
pronounces as follows: The laws of mechanics apply to the space R1, in respect to 
which the body S1 is at rest, but not to the space R2, in respect to which body S2 is 
at rest. But the privileged space R1 of Galileo, thus introduced, is a merely 
factitious cause, and not a thing that can be observed. (Einstein, 1916 [1952], pp. 
112-115) 
 
Newtonian theory fails to give a satisfactory answer because the space R1—namely, the 
inertial system—is invoked as the cause of the difference between the two bodies. This is 
philosophically objectionable because something unobservable is being granted a causal 
role and because this cause acts without being acted upon. Because of these features, 
Einstein holds the inertial system to be a factitious cause, which must be replaced by a 
genuine cause like the fixed stars. Einstein’s illustration bears out what some have called 
‘the action-reaction principle’: For something to be physical it cannot act without being 
acted upon.17 This idea is also found in Relativity: The Special and the General Theory 
(1916 [1939], pp. 171-173), The Meaning of Relativity (1922 [1950], pp. 54-55), and ‘On 
the aether’ (1924 [1991], pp. 15-18). 
 
Leaving aside the important fact that the action-reaction principle is based on a 
distortion of Mach’s and especially Newton’s views on rotation, the principle may be 
considered in its own right. I wish to consider three objections to it. To begin with, one 
might argue that the action-reaction principle is neither a metaphysical criterion of 
physicality nor an epistemological criterion of legitimate postulation but an arbitrary 
invention or ‘mere hypothesis.’ One might object, as Norton (1993, pp. 848-849) and 
Pitts (2006, p. 349) have, that a spurious necessity has been attributed to a principle that 
derives from Aristotelian and Leibnizian metaphysics, and thus is not empirically 
constrained. Second, one might argue that to think of the inertial system in Newtonian 
theory or special relativity as something that acts without being acted upon is to 
                                                
17Brown (2005, pp. 140-142) points out that a similar principle can be distilled from Leibniz’s philosophy: 
For something to be a substance it cannot act without being acted upon. See the Discourse on Metaphysics 
(section 14) and Monadology (proposition 61). 
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misunderstand its role in these theories. Neither Newtonian space-time nor the inertial 
system is being postulated as a theoretical entity that is the cause of inertial effects, for 
such a theoretical entity certainly would go against Newton’s theory in which one is 
always dealing with interactions in which the participants enter reciprocally. Rather, 
Newtonian space-time is the structure that is implicit in Newton’s account of causal 
influence; Minkowski space-time is the structure that is implicit in special relativity. To 
be sure, Newtonian space-time and Minkowski space-time express constraints on the 
possible evolution of fields—in just the same way that the Hilbert space structure of 
quantum mechanics and the configuration space of classical mechanics express 
constraints on possible states of systems. But such constraints do not represent the action 
of these structures on the fields in Einstein’s sense.18 Third, one might point out that the 
action-reaction principle amounts to a principle that excludes a priori the possibility that 
space-time is flat. But whether or not it makes sense to think of space-time as flat ought 
to be an empirical question. For example, the equivalence principle—it is impossible to 
distinguish locally between a homogeneous gravitational field and a uniformly 
accelerated frame—provides a basis for arguing that space-time is not flat. Therefore, 
there is certainly a basis for arguing that it does not make sense to think of space-time as 
unaffected by matter; but that argument is founded on an empirical hypothesis and not an 
a priori demand. Without the equivalence principle, one would have in Newtonian theory 
and special relativity space-time theories that are empirically unexceptionable. In such a 
case, the action-reaction principle would, strictly speaking, express nothing but a 
metatheoretical or metaphysical preference for a different sort of theory—a sort of theory 
that, in the absence of the equivalence principle or something like it, would be difficult to 
motivate empirically. 
 
Brown also objects to the action-reaction principle. His objection stems, in part, 
from his accounts of Leibniz’s and Newton’s views on space and time: ‘Nonentities do 
not act, so for Leibniz space and time can play no role in explaining the mystery of 
inertia.’ (Brown, 2005, p. 142) Regarding Newton’s view, he writes: 
                                                
18The recognition of this important point can be found in DiSalle (2002, p. 182), Brown (2005, p. 139), and 
Pitts (2006, p. 349). 
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For Newton, the existence of absolute space and time has to do with providing a 
structure, necessarily distinct from ponderable bodies and their relations, with 
respect to which it is possible systematically to define the basic kinematical 
properties of the motion of such bodies. For Newton, space and time are not 
substances in the sense that they can act, but are real things nonetheless. (Brown, 
2005, p. 142) 
 
But his main objection is that the non-dynamical affine and conformal structures whose 
application is controlled by Newtonian theory and special relativity do not figure in a 
causal explanation of inertial motion. They are ‘a codification of certain key aspects of 
the behaviour of particles and fields.’ (Brown, 2005, p. 142) 
 
It is interesting to contrast Brown’s view of inertial structure as a codification 
with Weyl’s view. While Einstein held that inertial structure in Newtonian theory and 
special relativity is a factitious cause, Weyl held that once inertial structure is understood 
to be inseparable from gravitation it must be recognised as something that ‘not only 
exerts effects upon matter but in turn suffers such effects.’ (Weyl, 1927 [1949], p. 105). 
He referred to the inertial structure of space-time as ‘the guiding field’ in analogy with 
other physical fields, notably, fluids. Brown remarks that ‘To appeal ... to the action of a 
background space-time connection in which the particles are immersed—to what Weyl 
called the “guiding field”—is arguably to enhance the mystery, not to remove it.’ 
(Brown, 2005, p. 142) Weyl’s account of the guiding field, with Brown’s emphasis on its 
fluid aspect, enhances the mystery because free particles do not know what kind of space-
time they are immersed in; they just do what they do.19 Though Brown does not 
acknowledge Weyl’s view except in these few remarks, it is safe to say that he dismisses 
the guiding field because it has a measure of explanatory power that is reminiscent of 
Einstein’s causal-explanatory account and that goes against his view that space-time 
structure should be regarded as a codification or representational framework. His use of 
‘codification,’ in fact, represents a deliberate deflation of inertial structure as something 
with explanatory power. 
                                                
19But there is another reading of Weyl that focuses on his account of the ‘world structure’ that is exhibited 
in inertial motion rather than on his account of the guiding field. See, e.g., DiSalle (2006a, pp. 137-149; 
2006b). 
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While Brown’s objection to the action-reaction principle as an argument against 
Newtonian theory and special relativity is decisive, there remains the matter of the 
conspiracy allegation. The allegation appears to be bound up with the non-dynamical 
character of the global affine and conformal structures. It arises because free particles 
traverse geodesics of an affine structure that is fixed. So, though Brown rejects the 
action-reaction principle, something close to the principle appears to underlie the 
allegation: Newtonian theory and special relativity control the application of background-
structures that shape the evolution of fields without being themselves shaped by them. In 
other words, there is no dynamical coupling of the affine and conformal structures to 
matter. 
 
3.2. Global coordinate systems as an artifice of thought 
Another philosophical intuition about inertial structure is found in Einstein’s view 
that global coordinate systems are an artifice of our thought. Nature is indifferent to our 
choice of coordinate systems and does not single out certain kinds.20 Einstein writes: 
 
What makes this situation appear particularly unpleasant is the fact that there 
should be infinitely many inertial systems, moving uniformly and without rotation 
with respect to one another, that are distinguished from all other rigid systems. 
(Einstein, 1951, pp. 27-29) 
 
There are a number of objections to this intuition. First, as DiSalle (2002, pp. 178-
180) has argued, saying that it is inherently mysterious that nature should distinguish 
certain kinds of inertial systems and their associated coordinate systems amounts to 
                                                
20This intuition is bound up with the principle of general covariance, according to which the possible laws 
of physics should be restricted to those that admit a coordinate-independent formulation. The satisfaction of 
the principle of general covariance was supposed to be a philosophical advantage of Einsteinian gravitation, 
one that eliminated the ‘epistemological defect’ peculiar to Newtonian theory and special relativity with 
their global inertial frames. When Kretschmann showed in 1917 that Einsteinian gravitation is not unique in 
this respect, Einstein (1918 [2002], p. 242; 1951, p. 69) proposed an alternative to the principle that he took 
to capture the theory’s characteristic feature and to surmount Kretschmann’s objection: The possible laws 
of physics should not only admit coordinate-independent formulations but these formulations should be the 
simplest and most transparent ones available to them. Einstein claimed that this methodological principle 
has ‘significant heuristic force.’ The notion of ‘theories that are not the simplest and most transparent in 
generally-covariant form’ means ‘theories that, in addition to being generally covariant, have other, non-
trivial symmetries.’ In this way, we are returned again to the a priori demand to eliminate theories that 
assert the possibility of global structure, theories whose status one would prefer to think of as an empirical 
question. 
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saying that it is inherently mysterious that space-time should have non-trivial symmetries. 
It may be that the existence of such symmetries and the dynamical laws that exhibit them 
are themselves mysterious, but the sense of mystery derives from a philosophical view, 
whatever that might be. Even if one were committed to such a view—one more akin to a 
form of apriorism than empiricism—it would be equally problematic that nature 
distinguishes conservative systems from all other physical systems. Second, one might 
point out that this intuition is bound up with a confusion about the relation between 
dynamical laws and coordinate systems; namely, the idea that Newton’s laws only ‘hold’ 
in special coordinate systems. This idea can be found in the work of various authors (e.g., 
Einstein, 1951, p. 27; Cushing, 1998, p. 98), and there are passages in which Brown 
appears to be making such a claim: ‘Inertial coordinate systems are those special 
coordinate systems relative to which the above conspiracy, involving rectilinear uniform 
motions, unfolds.’ (Brown, 2005, p. 17) To put this another way, a class of special 
coordinate systems is being postulated in which the laws of motion—the laws that 
determine the alleged conspiracy—hold. But this is to put the cart before the horse. 
Newton’s laws do not hold in special coordinate systems; they assert the possibility of 
coordinate systems in which all accelerations depend on impressed forces. The possibility 
of such systems is asserted by Newton’s laws; it is not a prerequisite for them.21 
 
Brown’s view is strongly reminiscent of the Einsteinian intuition that global 
coordinate systems are an artifice of thought. For Brown, free particles conspire precisely 
because ‘their motion appears extremely simple from the point of view of a family of 
privileged frames’ (Brown, 2005, p. 142). The idea that this family of frames is 
privileged—and that there is something metaphysically objectionable about this or any 
other privileged family—is at the root of the conspiracy allegation. 
 
3.3. Inertia as a concept in need of explanation 
There is another idea underlying the allegation of a conspiracy that should be 
singled out. This is the idea that inertia in Newtonian theory and special relativity is in 
need of an explanation; in other words, that a ‘dynamical origin of inertia’ is required. 
                                                
21See also DiSalle (2006a; 2002) in this regard. 
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This idea can be inferred from Brown’s claim that inertia finds an explanation in 
Einsteinian gravitation because a geodesic theorem can be proved. 
 
But the idea that there is something questionable about inertia because there is no 
more fundamental assumption from which it can be derived is based on a confusion. It is 
useful to recall how the concept of inertia arises in Newton’s account of causal 
interaction. The laws of motion define and interpret the concepts of force and mass, and 
these concepts determine inertial motion as that state in which a mass is unacted upon by 
forces. In this way, inertia is tied to Newton’s account of force; the concept of inertia 
cannot be articulated independently of dynamics. Neither inertia nor force, therefore, is a 
concept in need of an explanation. The laws of motion express mathematically 
formulated criteria for explicating and applying concepts that are already in use—e.g., 
the pre-theoretical concept of force as something determined by pushing, pulling or 
pounding some mass. 
 
Even if Brown were to reject some or all of these ideas or to question the relative 
support that they lend to his total view, the burden is still on him to explain the 
philosophical and methodological basis that supports the allegation of a conspiracy—in 
other words, to explain why we should ‘criminalise’ perfectly good empirical behaviour. 
At the very least, it is safe to say that, though Brown may disagree with the precise 
contours of Einstein’s view, he thinks that Newtonian theory and special relativity have a 
defect that is eliminated by Einsteinian gravitation. 
 
4. If inertia is conspiratorial, should a broad class of theories be so characterised? 
Leaving aside the philosophical and methodological basis that seems to motivate 
the allegation of a conspiracy, one might ask: If in fact there is something conspiratorial 
about inertial motion in Newtonian theory and special relativity, should a broad class of 
theories be so characterised? As a way of making sense of why one might read a 
conspiracy into the motion of free particles, one might suggest that, for a conspiracy 
theorist, all physical theories are conspiratorial to varying degrees. But I will argue that 
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this suggestion, in a sweeping sense at least, deflects attention from the ideas that truly 
motivate the conspiracy allegation. 
 
It is helpful to consider a few examples that do not bear out the correct sense of 
‘conspiracy.’ For example, one might say: If there is something conspiratorial about 
inertia, it is remarkable that there is nothing conspiratorial about the conservation of 
linear momentum, according to which the total momentum in an isolated system is 
conserved.22 Take, for example, a system of billiard balls in free space. The total 
momentum of the balls, before and after a collision, is conserved. One could impute to a 
conspiracy theorist the view that the balls conspire to interact only with each other and 
not with their environments, and to transfer momentum among themselves such that their 
total momentum is conserved. 
 
Or, if inertia is a conspiracy, why is there nothing conspiratorial about the motion 
of non-interacting charged particles in electromagnetic fields? Every electron interacts 
with a given electromagnetic field in exactly the same way. One could suggest that a 
conspiracy theorist might say that the electrons conspire to act in this way. But the 
conspiracy theorist might reply that the field is a common cause to which their motion 
can be attributed, and so the alleged conspiracy is explained away.23 On this line of 
reasoning, it is the presence of a field that charged particles can ‘feel’ that distinguishes 
their movement from the conspiratorial behaviour of free, uncharged particles. 
 
To take another example, if inertia is a conspiracy, there is equal reason to think 
of equilibrium as arising from a conspiracy. There are many ways in which one might 
formulate such a conspiracy. To take a simple example, consider a rod in uniform 
translatory motion whose particles are in a stable equilibrium configuration. We might 
then Lorentz-boost the rod so it travels faster. The rod undergoes an acceleration for the 
                                                
22One might think that the conservation of linear momentum is in fact an excellent example since, in the 
case of an isolated system, the principle of conservation of linear momentum simply is the principle of 
inertia. 
23For the same reason, there is nothing conspiratorial about the motion of a pair of harmonic oscillators—of 
similar constitution that are isolated from, and thus unable to communicate with, each other—oscillating at 
the same frequency. Presumably, there is a common cause in their past for the synchrony of the forces that 
produce the oscillations. 
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duration of the boost before settling into a new stable equilibrium configuration. One 
could imagine that a conspiracy theorist might say that the particles conspire to 
reassemble themselves into the Lorentz-contracted rod. But no doubt a conspiracy 
theorist thinks of equilibrium as explicable by locally-acting forces and would therefore 
reject the comparison. 
 
Though one might attempt to make sense of the conspiracy allegation in this way, 
this suggestion trivialises Brown’s view. Not one of these examples captures the sense of 
‘conspiracy’ or ‘pre-established harmony’ at issue for him. The principles and intuitions 
we have considered above reveal a view about absolute or global background-structures, 
structures that constrain the possible states of a system without themselves being 
influenced by the system’s evolution. 
 
To take an example that does seem to capture the correct sense of ‘conspiracy,’ 
we might look to the theory of weak interactions. Consider chiral or ‘handed’ processes, 
that is, processes whose theoretical account displays a left-right asymmetry. If inertia is a 
conspiracy, there is equally good reason for seeing something conspiratorial in the 
handedness exhibited by parity violation in the theory of weak interactions. Why isn’t 
there anything conspiratorial about the decay of, e.g., cobalt 60 atoms? How do all of the 
cobalt atoms in the universe know to exhibit handedness in the same sense when they are 
oblivious to one another? One could say that they conspire to do so.24 This example 
seems to have the salient feature: The relevant phenomenon, handedness, is tied to a 
global space-time structure, namely, orientation. The natural reply to the conspiracy 
theorist is, of course, that cobalt atoms display handedness not because they conspire but 
because parity-violating experiments are part of the evidentiary basis for orientation, one 
that we have specified in Minkowski space-time.25 But, for a conspiracy theorist, the 
orientation of Minkowski space-time ought to be just as problematic as the global affine 
structure. 
                                                
24This example is suggested by Brown (2005, p. 142; personal communication). A detailed discussion of 
parity violation in the decay of a cobalt 60 isotope, in the philosophical literature, can be found in Huggett 
(2000) and Pooley (2003). 
25For details on specifying the orientability and orientation of a manifold, see Malament (2012, §2.1-2.2). 
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What seems to underlie Brown’s view is the idea that absolute or global 
background-structures are what might be called ‘unexplained foundations.’ They are 
unexplained in the sense that they cannot be derived from more general assumptions. But 
the idea that there is a problem with unexplained foundations is itself problematic; it 
seems to reflect a foundationalism that is difficult to motivate empirically. Even if Brown 
acknowledges that ‘all explanation must stop somewhere,’ and so his view is not 
susceptible to any sort of regress, he still has to establish that, e.g., the global affine 
structures of Newtonian theory and special relativity are in need of an explanation—a 
view I have argued against in §3.3. Furthermore, if the notion of an unexplained 
foundation is indeed at the root of the conspiracy allegation, then there can hardly be 
much gain in explaining away the conspiracy of inertia by appealing to Einsteinian 
gravitation, for one can point to conspiratorial features even in that framework. 
 
One could regard the global topology, metric signature, orientability, and 
temporal orientation, among other features of Einsteinian gravitation, as having the marks 
of a conspiracy, in this more specific sense.26 Consider the Lorentzian signature of the 
pseudo-Riemannian metric. The Lorentzian signature of the metric does not come from 
the field equations; it is ensured by assuming the strong equivalence principle. Temporal 
orientation must also be specified. By examining these and other features of Einsteinian 
gravitation, we find that, while the affine and conformal structures are determined by the 
distribution of mass-energy, the theory requires the postulation of a number of quantities 
that do not come from the field equations alone. If there is any sense in which Newtonian 
theory and special relativity are conspiratorial, then certain features of Einsteinian 
gravitation can be said to be no less conspiratorial. 
 
To such a challenge, a conspiracy theorist might reply that, whenever we can 
explain the conspiratorial features of a theory by showing how they emerge from 
dynamics at a lower level, we have improved our understanding to a certain degree, we 
have shown that something miraculous at one level has a deeper reason. For example, 
                                                
26A discussion of the metric type (pseudo-Riemannian) and signature can be found in Brown (1997). 
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Einsteinian gravitation explains remarkable structural correspondences that were 
previously taken for granted. If indeed all physical theories are conspiratorial—in the 
specific sense of having unexplained foundations—such a strategy may be available to 
Brown. But this still fails to address the more important question of why we should 
regard the features in question as problematic. For example, though the Lorentzian metric 
signature, orientability, and temporal orientation in Einsteinian gravitation do not derive 
from the field equations, they are not brute posits; their application is controlled by 
empirical criteria. If the notion of an unexplained foundation is what is driving the 
conspiracy allegation, it is better by far to argue that there are no conspiracies at all. 
 
5. The alleged explanation of inertia by Einsteinian gravitation 
In this final section, I wish to address Brown’s claim that inertial motion is 
explained by Einsteinian gravitation. I will begin by presenting that claim as well as 
Weatherall’s challenge to it. I will then propose another way of thinking about the 
theorems that drive the claim. 
 
Brown claims: ‘GR is the first in a long line of dynamical theories ... that explains 
inertial motion.’ (Brown, 2005, p. 141) Further on, he writes: 
 
Inertia, in GR, is just as much a consequence of the field equations as 
gravitational waves. For the first time since Aristotle introduced the fundamental 
distinction between natural and forced motions, inertial motion is part of the 
dynamics. It is no longer a miracle. (Brown, 2005, p. 163) 
 
Brown’s claim rests on the fact that a geodesic principle—free particles traverse timelike 
geodesics—can be derived from Einstein’s field equations together with other 
assumptions.27 The claim seems to presuppose a deductive-nomological scheme: One can 
take the field equations, energy and conservation conditions, and the resulting geodesic 
principle as explanans, then derive the motion of a free particle as explanandum. 
 
                                                
27This is not quite Brown’s claim. Brown claims that the geodesic principle follows directly from the field 
equations, a claim that Malament (2012), in light of the result of Geroch and Jang (1975), has shown to be 
not so straightforward. Brown (personal communication) grants this and maintains nonetheless that inertial 
motion is explained by Einsteinian gravitation. 
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There are various geodesic theorems, but Geroch and Jang’s (1975) has a claim to 
being the most perspicuous, and I will limit my attention to it. Their theorem has the 
advantage of avoiding specific assumptions about the nature of the free, massive, test 
particle; it also has the advantage of showing that the particle traverses a curve in space-
time rather than a line singularity. In any case, if any geodesic theorem can be said to 
figure in a deductive-nomological explanation of inertial motion, the Geroch-Jang 
theorem can be said to do so. 
 
 Brown’s claim that inertial motion is explained by Einsteinian gravitation in a 
distinctive way was challenged by Weatherall (2011a), who showed that a geodesic 
principle can be derived in geometrised Newtonian gravitation. With this theorem in 
hand, Weatherall observes of inertial motion in geometrised Newtonian and Einsteinian 
gravitation: ‘if either theory can be thought to explain inertial motion, then both do, in 
much the same way.’ (Weatherall, 2011b, p. 280) 
 
A line of objection is available to Brown: Both Geroch and Jang’s and 
Weatherall’s theorems proceed from the fundamental assumption of the conservation of 
energy-momentum: ∇aTab = 0. But, in Einsteinian gravitation, the conservation condition 
follows from Einstein’s field equations; in geometrised Newtonian gravitation, it is an 
independent assumption. This line of objection is undermined by Weatherall, who argues 
that the conservation condition is a background assumption in both theories. It is an 
assumption that is more general than Newtonian and Einsteinian gravitation, an 
assumption about a general feature of the world that these theories and others respect. 
 
I agree with Weatherall’s observation that, if there is any sense in which 
Einsteinian gravitation can be said to explain inertial motion, then geometrised 
Newtonian gravitation can be said to explain it at least as well. But I will argue that the 
main contribution of these theorems lies not in their explanation but in their explication 
of inertial motion. By ‘explication,’ I mean the clarification afforded by these theorems of 
the conceptual structure of Einstein’s theory—of a certain account of matter, of the 
assumptions required for describing the evolution of that matter, and of the 
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interdependence of these conditions—rather than any importance they might have in 
some or another philosophical account of explanation. 
 
The geodesic theorems make explicit an assumption that Newton makes in his 
own account of inertial motion. Current discussions of inertial motion in old-fashioned 
Newtonian theory focus on the laws of motion and the corollaries to the laws. But there is 
an underappreciated discussion in the Scholium to the Laws in which Newton shows that 
the third law—and thus, the conservation of momentum—is necessary for the first law to 
apply to systems that are subject to attractive forces. The passage of interest to us is 
Newton’s demonstration of the third law of motion for attractions. The proof is 
straightforward. Take any two bodies A and B that attract each other. Place between them 
an obstacle that impedes their coming together. Suppose, for reductio, that A is more 
attracted to B than B is to A. That is, suppose that FB on A ≠ FA on B. Bodies A and B will 
move towards each other, both eventually reaching the obstacle. The obstacle will be 
pressed more strongly by body A than by body B, and so will not remain in equilibrium 
between them. The stronger pressure of A against the system comprising the obstacle and 
B will make the entire system of the three touching bodies move straight forward in the 
direction from A to B. In empty space, the system will go on indefinitely with a motion 
that is always accelerated. But this contradicts Law 1. Hence, our supposition that FB on A 
≠ FA on B must be false. Hence, FB on A = FA on B.28 
 
Though this demonstration of the third law focuses on a system of bodies, it is 
significant that the law applies also to a single body that is itself a composite system. The 
principle of inertia, taken on its own, is satisfied only in the case of point-particles. For 
bodies that are themselves composed of particles, the third law is a necessary condition 
for inertial motion. That is, the system of particles making up a single body must interact 
in such a way that every force is balanced, failing which the body will accelerate by its 
own internal forces and violate the principle of inertia. Therefore, the notion of 
                                                
28Newton is anticipating the application of the third law to the Solar System. He envisages the steps that he 
will take to show that the Solar System is effectively isolated. 
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equilibrium—as it pertains to a single, composite body as well as to a system of bodies—
enters Newtonian theory only via the third law.29 
 
Though it is often overlooked that the third law is a necessary condition for the 
first law to apply to systems held together by attractive forces, it was well understood by 
Newtonians in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries with whom it was further 
elaborated and clarified. There are too many to consider individually, but it is important 
to mention d’Alembert, who, in his Traité de Dynamique (1743 [1967]), proposed a 
rational mechanics founded on laws of impact between perfectly hard bodies. Though 
d’Alembert was manifestly a Newtonian, the influence of Descartes on d’Alembert’s 
thought can be clearly seen. D’Alembert sought to deduce the laws of mechanics from 
‘certain dispositions of size, figure and motion,’ in other words, from a purely 
geometrical account. From such a clearly and distinctly known geometrical basis, his 
laws of motion would be necessary truths and his mechanics would be a genuine 
metaphysical discovery. This view led d’Alembert to propose laws of motion that are 
close to Newton’s laws.30 In spite of its Cartesian aspect, however, d’Alembert’s 
mechanics is a restriction of Newtonian mechanics to the mechanics of rigid bodies.31 
 
D’Alembert understood clearly that Newton’s third law, and therefore the 
conservation of momentum, must be assumed to give an account of the transfer of motion 
from one body to another in a collision. Newton’s third law enters d’Alembert’s 
mechanics as ‘the principle of equilibrium,’ and the concept of equilibrium is the core of 
his ‘general principle,’ which we now know as ‘d’Alembert’s principle.’32 The principle 
                                                
29In Appendix A, I review how to formulate a principle of conservation of momentum for a Newtonian or 
special-relativistic system, with particular emphasis on how a state of equilibrium is obtained. 
30It is worth noting that D’Alembert was reluctant to write of forces. He eschewed the lingering notion of 
inherent cause and the vis viva controversy. He insisted that ‘force’ is only that quantity with which we are 
acquainted through its effects. 
31D’Alembert proposes to focus on bodies that act on one another by ‘immediate impulse, as in the case of 
an ordinary impact’ or by ‘the interposition between them of some body to which they are attached’ 
(d’Alembert, 1743 [1967], p. 49). He considers attractions to have been sufficiently well examined by 
Newton, and so sets these actions aside. 
32D’Alembert’s own statement of the principle (1743 [1967], p. 51) is not straightforward, but clear 
statements of its essential content can be found in the work of his successors. Thomson and Tait’s statement 
is one such; other statements are found in Mach (1883 [1919], pp. 335-337). For a good, recent discussion 
of the principle, see Lanczos (1970). 
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asserts that ‘all the forces acting on points of the system form, with the reactions against 
acceleration, an equilibrating set of forces on the whole system.’ (Thomson and Tait, 
1867 [1879], p. 248) This is the culmination of the Traité de Dynamique; it represents 
d’Alembert’s attempt to reduce the laws of mechanics to a single principle. 
 
With the general principle in hand, d’Alembert deduced three theorems. The first, 
which is of greatest interest to us, asserts that ‘[t]he state of motion or rest of the centre of 
gravity of several bodies does not change by the mutual action of these bodies among 
themselves, provided that the system is completely free’ (d’Alembert, 1743 [1967], Part 
II, Ch. 2, Theorem I). In this way, the principle of the conservation of the centre of 
gravity is recovered from his general principle. He deduced a second theorem, according 
to which ‘if weight or an accelerative force—constant for each body and different, if one 
wants, for each of them—acts on these bodies following parallel lines, the centre of 
gravity or rather the common centre of mass will describe the same curve that it would 
have described if these bodies had been free.’ (d’Alembert, 1743 [1967], Part II, Ch. 2, 
Theorem II) This theorem generalises the first to encompass those situations in which an 
isolated system is acted upon by a force that is sufficiently distant for the system to be 
treated like an isolated or ‘near enough’ isolated system.33 A third theorem generalises 
the first still further to encompass systems subject to a constraint. In the Scholia to the 
Theorems d’Alembert notes that these theorems are equally true for attractions; so, 
though he deliberately restricts his attention to rigid-body mechanics, he acknowledges 
that his principle has wider applicability. D’Alembert’s laws of motion and his general 
principle establish clearly that the total ‘quantity of motion’ or ‘momentum’ in isolated 
systems of interacting bodies is conserved. 
 
                                                
33Theorem II reveals d’Alembert’s understanding of Newton’s Corollary VI to the laws of motion. What is 
puzzling, however, is his suggestion that the forces may be different for each body. It may be that 
d'Alembert states Theorem II in the way that he does because he wants to acknowledge that Corollary VI 
contains an explicit (restrictive) hypothesis ‘If bodies are ... urged by equal accelerative forces along 
parallel lines...’ that is never strictly satisfied, except in the trivial case of zero accelerative forces. This 
reading seems to be supported by Sklar’s (2013, pp. 120-121) interpretation of Theorem II as a 
generalisation of the principle of the conservation of the centre of gravity ‘to include systems of particles 
all subject to the same external accelerating force, either constant and acting along parallel lines or directed 
to a point and distance-dependent.’ 
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The centrality of the conservation principle to Newtonian theory was equally well 
understood by Thomson and Tait in their Treatise on Natural Philosophy (1867 [1879]). 
In their discussion of Newton’s laws, they observe that 
 
Of late there has been a tendency to split the second law into two, called 
respectively the second and third, and to ignore the third entirely, though using it 
directly in every dynamical problem; but all who have done so have been forced 
indirectly to acknowledge the completeness of Newton’s system, by introducing 
as an axiom what is called D’Alembert’s principle, which is really Newton’s 
rejected third law in another form. Newton’s own interpretation of his third law 
directly points out not only D’Alembert’s principle, but also the modern 
principles of Work and Energy. (Thomson and Tait, 1867 [1879], p. 240) 
 
That the conservation of momentum is a necessary condition for the inertial motion of 
composite systems was noted in the same year by Maxwell in Matter and Motion (1867 
[1888]): 
 
... Newton goes on to point out the consequence of denying the truth of [the third 
law of motion]. For instance, if the attraction of any part of the earth, say a 
mountain, upon the remainder of the earth were greater or less than that of the 
remainer of the earth upon the mountain, there would be a residual force, acting 
upon the system of the earth and the mountain as a whole, which would cause it to 
move off, with an ever-increasing velocity, through infinite space. (Maxwell, 
1876 [1888], p. 48) 
 
This vivid illustration of the application of the third law to a body that is itself a 
composite system establishes in still another way the fundamental role of the 
conservation of momentum. 
 
What we find in the work of D’Alembert, Thomson and Tait, Maxwell, and others 
is a deliberate attempt to give a perspicuous account of the necessity of the conservation 
of momentum for the inertial motion of composite systems, a relation that is manifest but 
not as prominent in Newton. As Geroch and Jang and Weatherall have shown, this 
relation is equally essential to Einsteinian gravitation and geometrised Newtonian 
gravitation. Therefore, in old-fashioned Newtonian theory no less than in geometrised 
theories the account of inertial motion is not determined by any single principle 
susceptible of separate explanation but by an interdependence of physical principles that 
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must be assumed together. Old-fashioned Newtonian theory and the geometrised theories 
are in fact strongly analogous in their accounts of inertial motion: The third law of motion 
is to old-fashioned Newtonian theory as the conservation principles are to the 
geometrised theories. This analogy is clearly exhibited by the geodesic theorems, and it 
highlights the sense in which their contribution to our understanding does not lie in their 
explanation of inertial motion but in their explication of it. 
 
The sense of ‘explication’ in question has nothing to do with our ability to derive 
a previously unprovable proposition from a new theory, though, in the cases that concern 
us, the proofs contribute to that explication. Nor does this sense of explication have 
anything to do with any particular philosophical account of scientific explanation; and so 
it is independent of the success or failure that attaches to such an account. Rather, the 
explication is the fruit of an analysis that began with the question, on what assumptions 
does our use of the concept of inertia depend? The analysis reveals that, in both old-
fashioned Newtonian theory and in geometrised theories, inertia depends fundamentally 
on the conservation of momentum. Far from a concern with explaining the causal or 
dynamical origin of inertia, the geodesic theorems explicate the concept by revealing the 
connections between inertia and other concepts. 
 
6. Conclusion 
I set out to evaluate Brown’s account of inertial motion in Newtonian theory and 
special relativity; in particular, his claim that there is something objectionable—
something conspiratorial—about inertia in these theories. I presented and clarified the 
conspiracy allegation, and I argued that it is motivated by a commitment to a number of 
philosophical and methodological principles or intuitions that are reminiscent of 
Einstein’s view; namely, the action-reaction principle, the idea that global coordinate 
systems are an artifice of thought, and the idea that inertia in Newton’s theory is in need 
of an explanation. These principles reveal that the conspiracy allegation is bound up with 
a view according to which there is something problematic about absolute or global space-
time structures. I argued that, even if Brown does not accept some or all of these 
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principles, the onus is still on him to explain why there is anything problematic about 
inertial motion in Newtonian theory and special relativity. 
 
I then asked, if there is something conspiratorial about inertia, should a broad 
class of theories be so characterised? I considered the seemingly natural suggestion that, 
for a conspiracy theorist, all physical theories are conspiratorial. I examined and rejected 
a sweeping sense of ‘conspiracy’ that trivialises Brown’s view. I then examined a 
narrower sense that is bound up with the notion that absolute or global background-
structures are an unexplained foundation, and I pointed out that Einsteinian gravitation 
also has such features. I argued that, if indeed the conspiracy allegation is driven by this 
idea, then it is better to argue that there are no conspiracies at all. 
 
Last, I addressed Brown’s claim that inertia is explained by Einsteinian 
gravitation because a geodesic principle can be derived from the field equations. I 
reviewed Weatherall’s (2011b) challenge to Brown’s claim. Weatherall argued that, if 
there is any sense in which Einsteinian gravitation can be said to explain to inertia, then 
geometrised Newtonian gravitation explains it at least as well. While I agreed with 
Weatherall, I argued that there is a better way of thinking about the geodesic theorems. 
That is, their main contribution lies not in their explanation of inertial motion but in their 
explication of it. This explication is independent of any philosophical account of 
explanation under which inertia can be subsumed; it is concerned with clearly exhibiting 
the assumptions on which our use of the concept depends. 
 
I argued that the geodesic theorems of Geroch and Jang (1975) and Weatherall 
(2011a) explicate inertial motion by making perspicuous the dependency of inertial 
motion on the conservation of momentum. This is manifest, though under-appreciated, in 
Newton’s own account of inertia, and I argued that the work of his successors—notably, 
d’Alembert, Thompson and Tait, and Maxwell—represents a deliberate attempt to 
establish the fundamental importance of the conservation principle. In spite of their 
important differences, old-fashioned Newtonian theory, geometrised Newtonian 
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gravitation, and Einsteinian gravitation are strongly analogous in their accounts of inertial 
motion. 
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Chapter 3 
 
Friedman’s Thesis† 
 
1. Introduction 
In ‘Two dogmas of empiricism’ (1951), Quine represented scientific knowledge as a web 
of belief in which no satisfactory analytic-synthetic distinction can be drawn. In the 
absence of a suitably broad notion of analyticity, no propositions deserve to be singled 
out as being true in virtue of their meanings or as having any other measure of necessity, 
apriority or epistemic security. Quine acknowledged that certain stipulations like 
definitions are undoubtedly analytic, but that we can have no assurance that the 
propositions of mathematics are epistemologically distinguished from physical 
propositions just because they have been stipulated to be analytic. The arbitrariness that 
attaches to any such stipulation led him to reject the analytic-synthetic distinction.34 
 
This view, while motivated by a particular understanding of the logical 
empiricists’ approach to the analysis of theories, led Quine to the far more general view 
that no distinctions of kind can be drawn among the propositions comprising our web of 
belief. There is no distinction of kind between mathematical and physical propositions, 
and no distinction between these propositions and philosophical propositions. Philosophy 
is not a form of meta-theoretical or transcendental analysis, as has long been maintained; 
rather, philosophy is itself a part of scientific enquiry. Quine called this view 
‘naturalism.’ 
 
Friedman’s view is set against this naturalism. Friedman sees in the conceptual 
structures of Newtonian and Einsteinian gravitation a clear basis for correcting Quine. He 
defends the idea that a framework of physical knowledge is stratified, and he argues that, 
among the different kinds of principles comprising a theory, there are certain principles—
‘constitutive principles’—whose identification is indispensable to a satisfactory 
                                                
†A version of this chapter is under review at the time of submission. 
34Demopoulos (2013) proposes a way of establishing some of the principal conclusions that Carnap based 
on the analytic-synthetic distinction and that he defended in his long-standing controversy with Quine. It is 
significant that this proposal does not trade on the notions of truth in virtue of meaning, convention, or 
stipulation. 
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methodological analysis of physics. Friedman’s proposal culminates in the thesis that I 
call Friedman’s thesis: Revolutionary theory change proceeds by deliberate philosophical 
reflection on constitutive principles.35 My goal in this essay is to explicate and evaluate 
Friedman’s thesis. 
 
2. Friedman on the structure of physical theories 
Friedman defends an account of the structure of theories and theory change in 
which there are three levels of enquiry. The first level is comprised of principles that are 
epistemologically distinguished by the fact that they determine the framework of 
investigation; that is, they articulate a network of theoretical concepts and their physical 
interpretations. The second level is comprised of empirical hypotheses that are formulable 
within that framework. The third level is comprised by distinctly philosophical or meta-
theoretical principles that motivate discussions of the framework-defining principles and 
the transition from one theory to another. 
 
Those principles that determine the framework of investigation Friedman calls 
‘constitutive principles.’ Those that Friedman calls ‘mathematical principles’ supply the 
formal background or language that makes it possible to articulate a theory’s basic 
concepts and that makes particular kinds of applications possible. We find, among other 
examples, the calculus, linear algebra, and Riemann’s theory of manifolds. But there are 
other constitutive principles that have a more complex character: These ‘coordinating 
principles’ interpret the concepts that are necessary for physics as we understand it; they 
express criteria by which concepts such as force, mass, motion, electric field, magnetic 
field, space, and time may be applied. The mathematical principles are important, but the 
coordinating principles control the application of the mathematics, something the 
mathematics by itself does not do. 
 
                                                
35The thesis in question is exemplified in Dynamics of Reason (2001), and aspects of it are developed in 
‘Carnap and Quine: Twentieth-century echoes of Kant and Hume’ (2006), ‘Synthetic history reconsidered’ 
(2010a), ‘A post-Kuhnian approach to the history and philosophy of science’ (2010b), and ‘Einstein and the 
a priori’ (2011). 
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Friedman’s most careful characterisation of a constitutive principle is found in the 
following passage of Dynamics of Reason: ‘What characterizes the distinguished 
elements of our theories is ... their special constitutive function: the function of making 
the precise mathematical formulation and empirical application of the theories in question 
first possible.’ (Friedman, 2001, p. 40) This characterisation shows clearly that for 
Friedman there are two kinds of constitutive principles: those that supply the 
mathematical language that makes it possible to formulate the theory and that makes 
certain applications possible, and those that have a coordinating function. 
 
The notion of coordination peculiar to Friedman’s characterisation has its origin 
in Reichenbach (1920 [1965], section V; 1924 [1969], §2; 1928 [1958], §4). Reichenbach 
proposed an account of the structure of theories in which he defended a special class of 
physical principles that he called ‘coordinative definitions.’ These principles interpret 
theoretical concepts by associating them with something in the world of experience. To 
take what is perhaps the simplest example, Euclidean geometry becomes a theory of 
physical geometry by means of two coordinative definitions: The principle ‘light rays 
may be treated as straight lines’ interprets the Euclidean concept of straightness; the 
principle ‘practically rigid bodies undergo free motions without change of shape or 
dimension’ interprets the concept of congruence. Since the possibility of carrying out 
Euclidean constructions implicitly presupposes the concepts of straightness and 
congruence, these principles control the application of Euclidean geometry.36 Because of 
this interpretive function, Reichenbach regarded coordinative definitions as relativised 
but nonetheless ‘constitutive a priori principles’ that serve to apply an uninterpreted 
corpus of mathematics—the ‘categories’—to the world of experience. But they are not 
true absolutely; they develop along with physical theory, and so are relativised to 
particular contexts of enquiry. Furthermore, there exist coordinations that cannot be held 
at the same time. Reichenbach took it as a sort of Kantian principle that coordination is 
arbitrary, in the sense that no facts can fail to be accommodated within the framework of 
                                                
36See Appendix B for a discussion of these principles and their identification by Helmholtz and Poincaré. 
The appendix also contains a brief discussion of Maxwell’s equations. 
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a priori principles. But experience can show that combinations of individually reasonable 
coordinations can be inconsistent. 
 
Carnap (1934 [1951], p. 78) initially accepted Reichenbach’s notion of a 
coordinative definition without modification. But, in subsequent work, he came to regard 
that notion as an oversimplification. Where Reichenbach understood coordinative 
definitions to give a direct and complete interpretation of theoretical terms in terms of our 
observational vocabulary, Carnap held that such principles, which he came to call 
‘correspondence rules,’ interpret them only indirectly, and so partially and incompletely. 
In a mathematical theory, a theoretical term like ‘number’ can be interpreted completely 
in logical terms. But this is not possible in the case of modern physical theories. Given a 
theory of modern physics, in which one takes as primitive those theoretical terms that 
figure in a few fundamental laws of great generality, the correspondence rules ‘have no 
direct relation to the primitive terms of the system but refer to terms introduced by long 
chains of definitions .... For the more abstract terms, the rules determine only an indirect 
interpretation, which is ... incomplete in a certain sense.’ (1939, p. 65) The same view is 
found in ‘The Methodological Character of Theoretical Concepts’ (1956) and in 
Philosophical Foundations of Physics (1966). 
 
The oversimplification that Carnap identified in Reichenbach’s account is avoided 
by Friedman’s characterisation of a coordinating principle. But Friedman’s notion of a 
constitutive principle is broader than Reichenbach’s notion of a coordinative definition 
and Carnap’s notion of a correspondence rule; it encompasses principles that have a 
coordinating function, like Reichenbach’s and Carnap’s principles, as well as 
mathematical principles. What is common to Reichenbach, Carnap, and Friedman is the 
view that frameworks of physical knowledge are stratified. Those principles that are 
constitutive of the objects of scientific knowledge are not of the same kind as properly 
empirical hypotheses since they make those hypotheses ‘possible.’ 
 
This account of the structure of theories stands in sharp contrast with Quine’s 
‘naturalism,’ according to which no elements of the web of belief have any distinguished 
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epistemological status. Quine regarded set theory—and therefore all of mathematics—as 
continuous with physics. Philosophy, as a chapter of psychology, is part of this 
continuum. With this naturalism, it is precisely the stratification characteristic of the 
logical empiricists’ approach that is lost. For Friedman, Quine’s account of the structure 
of theories is a failure: It does not recognise that distinguishing constitutive principles 
from empirical hypotheses is essential to a satisfactory methodological analysis of 
physics, and it fails to appreciate the role played by constitutive principles in the 
articulation of basic theoretical concepts. This is what is lost with the replacement of 
stratification with the relative centrality of certain propositions in our web of belief. This, 
for Friedman, is the real divergence between Quine and the logical empiricists, Carnap 
foremost among them. 
 
What is more, Friedman claims that careful attention to the history of physics 
shows that revolutionary theory change proceeds by deliberate philosophical reflection on 
constitutive principles. Friedman offers this proposal as an alternative to Kuhn’s 
characterisation of revolutionary theory change as the result of a paradigm shift. The 
proposal is intended to illuminate revolutionary theory change not only in space-time 
physics but in physics in general. I will return to Friedman’s account of theory change in 
§5. 
 
Friedman’s work to restore a proper understanding of the stratification of our 
frameworks of physical knowledge is a significant contribution to methodology. But his 
characterisation of a constitutive principle nonetheless includes too much of a theory’s 
formal apparatus in the category of its constitutive principles. Friedman’s inclusion of 
mathematical principles is motivated by his view that the role of mathematics in physics 
is distorted when it is regarded as just another element of our web of belief.37 I agree with 
Friedman about this, but, in what follows, I will argue that ‘constitutive principle’ has a 
narrower reference. I will argue that mathematical principles should be distinguished 
                                                
37This view is found in Dynamics of Reason (2001) and also in ‘Carnap and Quine: Twentieth-century 
echoes of Kant and Hume’ (2006). Friedman argues that physical theories presuppose a number of 
mathematical theories for the articulation of basic concepts and for the generation of empirical predictions. 
But it is also essential to his view that constitutive principles—both mathematical and coordinating 
principles—define a space of intellectual possibilities. See Friedman (2001, p. 84). 
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from coordinating principles. Both mathematical principles and coordinating principles 
are non-factual, but for different reasons. Coordinating principles are ‘answerable’ to the 
world; mathematical principles are not. The former fix an interpretation of the world; the 
latter, as part of the formal background or language, are prerequisites to this. To put this 
another way, mathematical principles and coordinating principles have different criteria 
of truth. This is not to diminish the importance of the mathematical principles, but to 
emphasise that only the coordinating principles are constitutive—in the sense that they 
interpret theoretical concepts by expressing criteria for their application. 
 
3. The constitutive basis of Newtonian gravitation 
Friedman brings his approach to the analysis of physical theories to bear on 
Newtonian and Einsteinian gravitation. I will briefly present Friedman’s analysis of 
Newtonian gravitation, extending and sharpening a few important points. I will also 
consider Friedman’s claim that the calculus and Euclidean geometry are constitutive 
presuppositions. 
 
In keeping with the approach presented above, Friedman distinguishes 
constitutive principles, both mathematical and physical, and the framework they 
determine from empirical hypotheses whose formulation that framework permits. He 
presents Euclidean geometry, the calculus, and the laws of motion as constitutive 
presuppositions of the law of universal gravitation, which is a genuine empirical 
hypothesis (2001, Lecture II; 2010a, pp. 696-729; 2010b, p. 500; 2011, p. 1). 
 
Friedman asks us to consider the relation between the law of universal gravitation 
and the laws of motion. The law of universal gravitation asserts that every object in the 
universe attracts every other object with a force that is directed along the line intersecting 
the two objects, and that is proportional to the product of their masses and inversely 
proportional to the square of the distance between them. The concepts of mass and force 
to which the law refers, however, are constituted by the second law of motion, a law that 
itself presupposes a state of inertial motion. And that state of motion, in turn, is 
constituted by the first and third laws. Only when they are taken together do the laws of 
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motion constitute the concepts of force, mass, and inertial motion. These concepts have 
intuitive, pre-systematic meanings that are independent of the laws; for example, one may 
speak of a push-force or tension-force. But, while such meanings may suffice for 
everyday purposes, they provide no basis for recognising an instance of the concept in an 
unambiguous and intersubjective manner, and, most importantly, they provide no basis 
for measuring force. It is the laws of motion that constitute the concepts of force, mass, 
and inertial motion by expressing criteria for their application. The sense of ‘constitutive’ 
at issue is not merely that the laws of motion define the concepts to which they refer but 
that they interpret them. That is to say, they associate theoretical concepts with 
empirically measurable correlates. 
 
What is more, the laws of motion are constitutive not only of a particular 
conception of force, mass, and inertial motion but of a particular conception of space, 
time, and causality.38 With the development of a more abstract view of geometry in the 
twentieth century, it was shown that the space-time structure determined by the laws can 
be treated as a particular kind of four-dimensional affine space, with a specific foliation, 
and with temporal and spatial metrics having certain properties.39 But this affine space, 
taken in itself, is just an instance of an abstract geometry of the sort made possible by 
twentieth-century methods. It is the laws of motion that control its application in physical 
theory. 
 
All three laws of motion taken together therefore are constitutive of the 
framework that the inverse-square law requires for its formulation: They determine and 
control the application of the framework of empirical investigation—a framework that 
allows us to pose questions to be answered by the phenomena of motion, including 
questions about central forces to which the inverse-square law is an answer. Our ability to 
pose questions depends foremost on the conception of causal explanation that is 
                                                
38It is noteworthy that, for Kant, the employment of our metaphysical concepts of causal interaction, force, 
motion, space, and time is inseparable from Newton’s laws. 
39The invariance of the velocity of light is another basis on which to treat space-time as a different kind of 
affine space. 
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expressed in the framework of the laws. The framework identifies the sorts of changes 
that are objectively measurable and that are indicative of the action of some cause. 
 
Having addressed the relation between the law of universal gravitation and the 
laws of motion, Friedman asks us to consider next the relation between the laws of 
motion and the calculus. The concept of acceleration that figures in the second law is a 
quantity that requires the notion of instantaneous rate of change: Acceleration is the 
instantaneous rate of change of velocity, which is itself the instantaneous rate of change 
of position. Only with the calculus do we have an account of limiting processes and 
instantaneous rates of change; in short, a mathematical account of continuity. Friedman 
claims that the calculus, therefore, is a constitutive presupposition of Newtonian 
dynamics. 
 
But, contrary to Friedman’s view, the calculus should be characterised as part of 
the formal background or language that makes possible particular applications of 
Newton’s laws and not as part of the theory’s constitutive basis.40 This is not to say that 
the calculus is not necessary for formulating Newtonian theory. One might say that the 
account of force in the second law is intelligible without the calculus; for example, one 
might suggest that force can be understood as the instantaneous result of pulling, pushing 
or pounding some mass. But it is the calculus that allows us to formulate the notion of a 
continuously-varying power, to develop the idea, for example, that Keplerian motion 
might be the manifestation of a yet-undetermined but continuously-varying force.41 In 
this respect, the calculus certainly makes possible particular applications of the laws of 
motion, but it is not constitutive; it does not itself have an interpretive function. Further 
principles are required for its application in physical theory. 
 
                                                
40More generally, the calculus is part of the theory’s inferential apparatus: It tells us how particular 
quantities evolve given some initial data. 
41By way of another example, one could also say that the Galilean composition of motions can be 
understood without the calculus; for example, the composition of the Earth’s annual revolution around the 
sun and its diurnal rotation. But it is the calculus that allows us to treat arbitrary, continuous orbits as 
instances of the Galilean composition of motions. 
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For the same reason, Euclidean geometry should also be characterised as part of 
the formal background that Newtonian gravitation presupposes for its formulation. For 
Friedman, as for Kant, Euclidean geometry is a constitutive presupposition of Newtonian 
gravitation. Newton’s own development of his theory presupposes the straightedge-and-
compass constructions of Euclidean geometry, which Kant took to reflect our spatio-
temporal intuition. As we have noted, however, the space-time structure of Newton’s 
completed dynamical theory is a particular kind of four-dimensional affine space, with 
separate spatial and temporal metrics. The laws of motion, therefore, control the 
application of this particular affine space and not the framework of Euclidean geometry 
whose interpretation the laws already take for granted. But, setting this aside, what 
Friedman’s claim most clearly brings to light is the sense of ‘constitutive presupposition’ 
at issue for him. Here the sense expressed is close to the ordinary dictionary sense of 
‘presupposition,’ namely, ‘a thing tacitly assumed beforehand at the beginning of a line 
of argument’ (OED). This sense of ‘constitutive presupposition’ can also be found in the 
work of Poincaré, who pointed out that a geometry must be presupposed for the 
construction of a dynamical theory, but that doing so neither assumes nor precludes the 
possibility that the completed theory or another theory that is in some sense more 
fundamental may lead us to revise our presuppositions about geometry. Such a sense may 
be defensible, but it is different from the one exemplifed in the laws of motion. 
 
Besides the importance of distinguishing principles that are answerable to the 
world from those that are not, another important result of separating principles that 
interpret theoretical concepts from mathematical principles or prerequisites is that it 
defends the idea of a constitutive principle against trivialisation. It might be argued that 
what is constitutive is relative to a theory’s particular axiomatisation or formalisation, 
and, since what is constitutive in one axiomatisation or formalisation of a theory is not 
constitutive in another, the very idea of a constitutive principle is a wash. The limitation I 
propose permits agreement on the principles that interpret the theoretical concepts of a 
given theory, even if that theory admits of an alternative axiomatisation or formalisation. 
Newtonian theory, for example, admits of various mathematical settings, and those 
mathematical settings peculiar to analytic mechanics are radically different from 
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Newton’s own constructive methods. But, even in the Lagrangian formulation, for 
example, Newtonian theory still expresses the same fundamental picture of space, time, 
and causality. However it is developed mathematically, Newtonian theory is the theory 
whose basic theoretical concepts are constituted by the laws of motion. 
 
 In spite of these criticisms of Friedman’s characterisation of the calculus and 
Euclidean geometry, and so of the scope of his characterisation of a constitutive principle, 
his criticism of Quine’s naturalism remains intact. His approach to the analysis of 
physical theories aims to clarify the relations between the inverse-square law, the laws of 
motion, the calculus, and Euclidean geometry. And that analysis does succeed in showing 
that these parts of the total framework of Newtonian gravitation are not of the same kind. 
 
Much as this analysis is clarifying, there is a further sense in which the laws of 
motion are constitutive, one essential to Newton’s own understanding of gravitation. One 
can read Newton’s argument from the framework determined by the laws of motion to his 
gravitation theory as arising from a question about the applicability and adequacy of that 
framework for giving an account of celestial motion. By pressing the laws of motion as 
far as they can be pressed, that is, by boldly postulating that all bodies influence each 
other as per the third law of motion, we are driven to the hypothesis that there is an 
attraction—a ‘universal gravitation’—between all bodies that acts instantaneously at a 
distance. It is only with this empirical hypothesis that an estimate of the masses of the 
bodies comprising a planetary system becomes possible; that an estimation of the centre 
of mass of the system is possible; and only with this hypothesis, therefore, that a 
planetary system can be considered as approximating an inertial frame. The form of the 
gravitational interaction, however, is not postulated but ‘deduced from the phenomena’ of 
planetary motion and gravitational free fall once these phenomena are understood within 
the necessary and sufficient framework of the laws of motion. Furthermore, not only was 
universal gravitation an open question but so also was the characterisation of its 
properties; for example, does gravitation propagate through a medium or immediately at a 
distance? 
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 The idea that, given the framework of the laws of motion, an account of celestial 
motion is an open empirical question was central also to Euler’s understanding of 
Newton.42 Euler (1775 [1768-1772]), for all his work to turn Newton’s theory into what 
we now recognise as ‘Newtonian mechanics,’ rejected action at a distance. He hoped a 
viable vortex theory would replace Newton’s theory of attraction. But, in spite of that, he 
recognised the difference between the parts of Newton’s theory that any theory of motion 
must constitutively presuppose and hypotheses formulable within that framework: 
 
Euler saw the difference between the elements of Newton’s theory that were, so to 
speak, idiosyncratically Newtonian—above all the idea that univeral gravitation is 
the sole force at work in the Solar System—and those that represented the 
common basis of all work in mechanics as then understood, especially the laws of 
motion and their underlying framework of space and time. Thus he acknowledged 
the distinction between the physical hypotheses that one might prefer, pursue, and 
evaluate within the general framework of mechanics, and the conceptual 
framework without which such hypotheses could not even be intelligible. 
(DiSalle, 2006a, p. 51) 
 
Euler recognised clearly that the laws of motion constitute a framework of investigation 
that is independent of hypotheses about what sorts of forces there are. He allowed for the 
possibility of an alternative to universal gravitation, all the while recognising that a 
Cartesian or any other proponent of a vortex hypothesis must himself presuppose the 
laws of motion in giving that alternative.43 
 
4. Friedman’s analysis of Einsteinian gravitation 
Let us turn now to Friedman’s analysis of Einsteinian gravitation. Friedman 
regards that framework as the outcome of three revolutionary advances, namely, the 
development of Riemann’s theory of manifolds, Einstein’s insight of 1907 that is 
summarised in the equivalence principle, and Einstein’s field equations. All three were 
brought together to eliminate the contradiction between the instantaneous action at a 
distance postulated by Newtonian gravitation and the invariance of the velocity of light in 
                                                
42See Aiton (1972) and especially Wilson (1992) for discussions of Euler’s rejection of action at a distance 
and for further references. 
43It is noteworthy that the laws of motion are implicitly presupposed not only in Cartesian physics but also 
in the work of Galileo, Huyghens, Wallis, and Wren on projectile motion and elastic collisions. This was 
Newton’s argument for taking them to be axioms. 
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special relativity. In keeping with his approach to the analysis of theories, Friedman 
distinguishes constitutive principles, both mathematical and physical, from properly 
empirical hypotheses: 
 
... the three advances together comprising Einstein’s revolutionary theory should 
not be viewed as symmetrically functioning elements of a larger conjunction: the 
first two [Riemann’s theory and the equivalence principle] function rather as 
necessary parts of the language or conceptual framework within which the third 
[the field equations] makes both mathematical and empirical sense. (Friedman, 
2001, p. 39) 
 
Further on, we find a sharper statement of Friedman’s view that the equivalence principle 
functions to coordinate Einstein’s field equations with experience: 
 
Einstein’s field equations describe the variations in curvature of space-time 
geometry as a function of the distribution of mass and energy. Such a variably 
curved space-time structure would have no empirical meaning or application, 
however, if we had not first singled out some empirically given phenomena as 
counterparts of its fundamental geometrical notions—here the notion of geodesic 
or straightest possible path. The principle of equivalence does precisely this, 
however, and without this principle the intricate space-time geometry described 
by Einstein’s field equations would not even be empirically false, but rather an 
empty mathematical formalism with no empirical application at all. (Friedman, 
2001, pp. 38-39) 
 
This is the core of Friedman’s analysis of Einsteinian gravitation: Riemann’s theory of 
manifolds and the equivalence principle are constitutive presuppositions of Einstein’s 
field equations. 
 
But there is a further aspect to this analysis that I will touch on only briefly: 
Friedman claims that the equivalence principle is elevated to the status of a definition in 
Poincaré’s sense: ‘In using the principle of equivalence to define a new four-dimensional 
inertial-kinematical structure, therefore, Einstein has ‘elevated’ this merely empirical fact 
to the status of a “convention or definition in disguise”’ (Friedman, 2011, p. 8).44 This 
claim is motivated by the fact that, though both Newton and Einstein were aware that 
                                                
44In some passages, such as the one quoted, Friedman writes ‘elevated to the status of a definition’; in 
others (e.g., Friedman, 2001, pp. 90-91), he writes ‘elevated to a coordinating principle.’ Whichever term is 
used, these passages reveal a central feature of Friedman’s view, namely, that taking some principle as a 
new constitutive principle involves an element of decision or convention. 
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inertial mass and gravitational mass are indistinguishable, only Einstein took that 
indistinguishability as a basis for reinterpreting the concept of inertial motion. This claim 
is analogous to Friedman’s claim that Einstein elevated the light postulate to the status of 
a definition: Whereas Lorentz took the invariance of the velocity of light as something to 
be explained by his theory of the electron, Einstein elevated it to the status of a definition, 
which he took as a basis for reinterpreting the concept of simultaneity.45 
 
I will take issue with Friedman’s claim that the equivalence principle and 
Riemann’s theory are constitutive presuppositions by recalling Einstein’s argument for a 
new concept of inertial motion and by contrasting that argument with Friedman’s 
account. In my presentation of Einstein’s argument I have not hesitated to make use of 
conceptual and mathematical insights that were gained only later. This departure from the 
actual history focuses attention on the shape of the argument without getting tangled up 
in questions about the success of individual steps. 
 
4.1. The argument for curvature 
Einstein took the first steps towards the inertial frame concept characteristic of his 
gravitation theory in 1905. The 1905 inertial frame concept emerged as the result of 
Einstein’s recognition that the nineteenth-century inertial frame concept uncritically 
assumes that two inertial frames agree on whether spatially separated events happen 
simultaneously. He showed that determining whether two spatially separated events are 
simultaneous depends on a process of signalling. The velocity of light—implicit in 
Maxwell’s theory and established experimentally by Michelson, Morley, and others—is 
the same in all reference frames, and Einstein showed that a criterion involving emitted 
and reflected light signals permits us to identify the time of occurrence of spatially 
separated events and to derive the Lorentz transformations. This forms the basis of 
Einstein’s special theory of relativity. With Einstein’s analysis of simultaneity, the 
nineteenth-century concept gave way to the 1905 inertial frame concept: An inertial 
                                                
45It is significant that, though Friedman takes inspiration from Poincaré, ‘raised to the status of a postulate’ 
means more than simply treating something as a definition. For Einstein, ‘raised to the status of a postulate’ 
means treating an empirical principle, e.g, the light postulate, as fundamental and not further explicable; 
Einstein then uses the light postulate as the basis for a definition or criterion of simultaneity. 
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frame is not merely one in uniform rectilinear motion but one, furthermore, in which light 
travels equal distances in equal times in arbitrary directions. 
 
But no sooner was the 1905 inertial frame concept established than Einstein 
subjected it to a further critical analysis. In 1907, Einstein had an insight that is 
summarised in the equivalence principle. It is with this principle that the argument for 
curvature begins.46 
 
Before addressing the 1907 insight, however, it is important to note that by ‘the 
equivalence principle,’ some will think immediately of the universality of free fall that 
was first established by Galileo: All bodies fall with the same acceleration in the same 
gravitational field. It may also be stated: The trajectory of a body in a given gravitational 
field will be independent of its mass and composition. Yet another statement with the 
same empirical content arises in the framework of Newtonian theory. As is well known, 
Newtonian theory comprises two different concepts of mass: inertial mass m, the quantity 
that figures in the second law, that is, the measure of a body’s resistance to acceleration; 
and gravitational mass µ, the quantity that figures in the inverse-square law. It is a well-
established experimental fact that the ratio of gravitational mass to inertial mass is the 
same for all bodies to a high degree of accuracy. And, once we accept that the ratio is a 
constant, we can choose to use units of measurement that make the two masses for any 
body equal, so that µ/m = 1. In this way we can ignore the distinction between 
gravitational mass and inertial mass. This is summarised in what is often called ‘the weak 
equivalence principle’: Inertial mass is equivalent to gravitational mass. It is easy to 
show—though I will not sketch the argument here—that this statement implies that the 
acceleration of any body due to a gravitational field is independent of its mass and 
composition. 
 
In Newtonian theory, the proportionality of inertial mass and gravitational mass is 
a remarkable fact that lacks an explanation. That explanation is found in Einstein’s 1907 
                                                
46I intend ‘the argument for curvature’ as shorthand for ‘the arguments for curvature’ or, better, ‘Einstein’s 
chain of reasoning.’ I acknowledge that it may not be possible to formulate the motivation for curvature as 
a single, coherent argument. 
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insight of the equivalence principle. The insight is illustrated most clearly with Einstein’s 
‘box.’47 Suppose you sit in a box from which you cannot look out. You feel a 
‘gravitational force’ towards the floor, just as you would at home. But you have no way 
of excluding the possibility that the box is part of an accelerating rocket in free space, and 
that the force you feel is an accelerative force. This also runs the other way: You are 
inside the box. You feel no gravitational force, just like in free space. But you have no 
way of excluding the possibility that you are freely falling in a gravitational field. 
Einstein’s insight is that accelerative and gravitational forces must be identical. The 
insight is summarised in the equivalence principle: It is impossible to distinguish locally 
between a homogeneous gravitational field and a uniformly accelerated frame. This has 
as a consequence that matter obeys the same laws in a freely falling frame that it would in 
an inertial frame. Einstein began to recognise in this consequence that inertial motion and 
freely falling motion are different presentations of the same motion. 
 
But Einstein’s argument does not end here: It is crucial that not only matter but 
light—and moreover, all physical processes—obey the same laws in a freely falling 
frame that they would in an inertial frame.48 Einstein’s bold extension is motivated by the 
observation that there are no physical phenomena that are independent of gravitation and 
that could distinguish a box in a homogeneous gravitational field from a box subject to a 
uniform acceleration. This is also readily illustrated by Einstein’s ‘box.’ Suppose you sit 
in the box, only this time there is a window. You feel a ‘gravitational force’ towards the 
floor, just as you would at home. And, as before, there is no way of excluding the 
possibility that the box is part of an accelerating rocket in free space, and that the force 
you feel is an accelerative force. But this time a light ray enters the window. Since light 
carries energy and energy has mass, the light ray, on entering the box, will not travel 
across the box horizontally to hit a point opposite its point of entry, but will curve 
downwards towards the floor—in analogy with a ball thrown horizontally in the 
gravitational field of the Earth. Assuming that the slight curve of its path were 
                                                
47This illustration is found notably in The Evolution of Physics (Einstein & Infeld, 1938, pp. 218-222). 
48This extension of the principle to all physical processes is often referred to as the universal coupling of all 
non-gravitational fields to gravitation. 
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measurable, a light ray cannot distinguish the box on Earth from the box that is part of the 
accelerating rocket. 
 
Einstein’s insight of 1907, together with this bold extension, led him to recognise 
freely falling motion and inertial motion as different presentations of the same motion. In 
this way, the equivalence principle functions as a criterion for identifying two previously 
distinct concepts of motion.49 
 
To return, for a moment, to the proportionality of inertial and gravitational mass 
in Newtonian theory, the equivalence principle establishes that homogeneous 
gravitational forces and accelerative forces are identical.50 Since the two concepts of 
mass figure in the expressions for gravitational force and accelerative force, the principle 
implies that inertial and gravitational mass are not merely proportional or equivalent but 
identical. In this way the equivalence principle explains the remarkable proportionality of 
inertial and gravitational mass in Newtonian theory.51 
 
Einstein’s box illuminates the equivalence principle in both its destructive and 
constructive aspects. The principle is destructive because it fatally undermines the 
determinateness of the 1905 inertial frame concept. That is to say, the concept fails to 
                                                
49One could object that Newton had already recognised freely falling motion and inertial motion as 
different presentations of the same motion; one could suggest that Corollary VI to the laws of motion 
reflects just this. Corollary VI holds that if bodies moving with respect to one another are influenced by 
uniform accelerative forces along parallel lines they will move with respect to one another in the same way 
they would if they were not influenced by those forces. In this way, Corollary VI establishes that matter 
obeys the same laws in a freely falling frame that it would in an inertial frame. But, for Newton, a 
‘Corollary VI frame’ is only an approximation to an inertial frame determined by the laws of motion; it is a 
good approximation to an inertial frame in the case where the uniform accelerative forces act along lines 
that are very nearly parallel. Newton had good reason for thinking that the Corollary VI frame should not 
be identified with an inertial frame. It was Einstein’s insight of 1907, and moreover the extension to all 
non-gravitational forces, that was the crucial interpretive step, namely, recognising freely falling motion 
and inertial motion as different presentations of the same motion. 
50Note that the accelerative forces in question here do not include electromagnetic forces or the weak or 
nuclear forces. 
51This way of presenting the explanation of the proportionality of inertial and gravitational mass serves to 
reinforce the importance of prising the universality of free fall from the equivalence principle. Doing so 
contributes to our understanding of different aspects of the gravitational interaction and to our 
understanding of the relation between them. But it is essential to note that the so-called equivalence 
principle is an interpretive extrapolation. The principle that is tested is the universality of free fall. 
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provide empirical criteria for identifying a unique state of motion as it was supposed to. It 
is constructive because it motivates a new concept of inertial motion. 
 
With the recognition of a new concept of inertial motion, the question arises: How 
is this concept to be interpreted? Special relativity presupposes the mathematical 
framework of an affine space equipped with a Minkowski metric. And, in the special 
theory, the trajectories of bodies moving inertially as well as those of light rays are 
interpreted as the straight lines or geodesics with respect to the Minkowski metric while 
gravitation is a force that pulls bodies off their straight-line trajectories. But Einstein, 
with the help of Grossmann, saw that Riemann’s newly-developed theory of manifolds 
offered an alternative to such an affine space for interpreting inertial trajectories: Inertial 
trajectories can be interpreted as the geodesics with respect to a new metric that is 
determined by the distribution of mass and energy in the universe. Einstein’s 
reinterpretation of free fall is summarised in what is sometimes referred to as the 
geodesic principle: Free massive point-particles traverse time-like geodesics.52 
 
With this reinterpretation of inertial trajectories, gravitation is no longer a force 
causing acceleration, as in Newton’s theory, but a manifestation of curvature depending 
on the mass-energy distribution. This ‘geometrisation’ of gravitation is at the heart of 
Einstein’s proposal for a new gravitation theory. And, with it, Einstein was faced with the 
problem of constructing a new theory in which a yet-undetermined quantity representing 
chrono-geometry is coupled to a yet-undetermined source-term representing the local 
mass-energy distribution. 
 
The preceding account is a rational reconstruction that avoids various pitfalls and 
distractions raised by the actual history: from the special theory understood in three-plus-
one dimensions not four, through Mach’s principle and the equivalence principle, the 
‘rotating disks’ and Gauss’s theory of non-Euclidean continua, to Riemann’s theory and 
                                                
52The geodesic principle is stated in terms of point-particles because it holds only approximately for 
extended bodies. The geodesic principle for light rays may be stated: Light rays traverse light-like 
geodesics. 
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the geodesic principle. However the actual argument falls short, it remains that it was 
sufficient for motivating a new and purely local definition of a geodesic. 
 
4.2. The equivalence principle and Riemann’s theory are not constitutive 
With this brief presentation of the argument for curvature in hand, let us return to 
Friedman’s claim that the equivalence principle and Riemann’s theory are constitutive. 
 
In my presentation of the argument for curvature, I have shown that the 
equivalence principle functions as a criterion for identifying two distinct concepts of 
motion. This identification is the pivotal step that permits the reinterpretation of free fall 
as geodesic motion. On my analysis therefore—and in contrast with Friedman’s—the 
equivalence principle is not a constitutive principle. Though the principle motivates a 
new concept of inertial motion, it does not constitute that new concept by expressing a 
criterion for its application. It is the geodesic principle that does that: If a body is freely 
falling, it is moving on a geodesic; if not, its motion deviates from a geodesic—in a way 
that a yet-to-be-constructed theory might measure. The geodesic principle forms the basis 
for treating the relative accelerations of freely falling particles, which can of course be 
treated in the Newtonian fashion, as a measure of curvature, expressed as geodesic 
deviation. In this way the geodesic principle replaces the laws of motion as constitutive 
presuppositions of the concept of inertial motion. The geodesic principle forms the basis 
for thinking about gravitation as a metrical phenomenon; in other words, for establishing 
its geometric character. It determines a new framework of investigation, one that makes it 
possible to pose a question to which Einstein’s equations are an answer. 
 
This account is significant for its clarification of the role of the equivalence 
principle in the conceptual framework of gravitation theory. It also distinguishes the 
equivalence principle and the geodesic principle as separate elements of that framework. 
Though the two principles are closely related in Einsteinian gravitation, it is conceivable 
that future work will reveal that the equivalence principle holds in the face of still more 
rigorous tests, but that the geodesic principle must be given up—for example, in some 
new theory of the gravitational interaction. 
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What of Friedman’s claim that Riemann’s theory of manifolds is a constitutive 
presupposition of Einstein’s reinterpretation of inertial trajectories as geodesics? 
Friedman wishes to draw attention to the crucial step of taking spaces of variable 
curvature to be physical possibilities. It is this step that makes a theory that associates a 
space-time of variable curvature with the distribution of mass-energy an intellectual 
possibility. The importance of this step to the construction of the gravitation theory 
cannot be overstated. But I believe one must distinguish between two things. The first is 
the transition from the conceptual framework of homogeneous spaces—those in which 
the principle of free mobility is satisfied—to the more general framework of variably-
curved spaces in which the former is a special case. The second is the transition to the 
mathematical framework of Riemann’s theory of spaces of arbitrarily variable curvature 
that may be regarded as a realisation of that conceptual framework. While both 
transitions are prerequisites for the construction of Einsteinian gravitation, it is the 
transition to the conceptual framework of variably-curved spaces that seems to capture 
Friedman’s point. That is, it is the conceptual framework of variably-curved spaces and 
not Riemann’s theory that is constitutive in Friedman’s sense. Nor is Riemann’s theory 
constitutive in the narrower sense I have defended. It is, rather, part of the formal 
background that makes the construction of Einsteinian gravitation possible—in the same 
sense as the calculus and Euclidean geometry in the case of Newtonian theory. We need 
some physical principle that expresses criteria for the application of Riemann’s theory. 
 
Friedman’s inclusion of Euclidean geometry, Riemann’s theory, and the calculus 
in the category of constitutive principles widens that category in the direction of taking 
everything required for the formulation of a theory to be constitutive. The principles that 
are truly constitutive are not those that supply the formal background or language 
necessary for the formulation of a theory or that make particular kinds of applications 
possible, but those that interpret theoretical concepts by expressing criteria for their 
application; those same principles control the application of mathematical theories such 
as Euclidean geometry, affine space, Riemann’s theory, and others. 
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As with my criticism of Friedman’s characterisation of the constitutive basis of 
Newtonian gravitation, this account of the constitutive basis of Einsteinian gravitation in 
no way undermines Friedman’s criticism of Quine’s naturalism. I am arguing only for a 
different account of that basis and a more developed response to Quine. Friedman’s 
account of the structure of physical theories aims to distinguish a theory’s constitutive 
principles from the properly empirical hypotheses whose formulation they permit; and it 
aims, in this way, to vindicate something close to the analytic-synthetic distinction 
rejected by Quine. But Friedman’s characterisation of both mathematical principles and 
coordinating principles as constitutive principles neglects that the coordinating principles 
are answerable to the world while the mathematical principles are not. So, while 
Friedman is correct to separate constitutive principles from empirical hypotheses, there is 
a further distinction that his account does not capture. 
 
Let me briefly address Friedman’s view that Einstein ‘elevated’ the equivalence 
principle to the status of a definition. The idea of such an elevation is based on a 
misunderstanding of Einstein’s 1907 insight that is summarised in the equivalence 
principle. From my presentation of the argument for curvature, it should be clear that the 
1907 insight has nothing to do with an elevation to a definition, but consists in the 
recognition that inertial motion and freely falling motion are different presentations of the 
same motion. While the recognition of their identity was the first step in Einstein’s 
argument for a new inertial structure, it seems odd to characterise the principle that 
brought it about as based on a stipulation (‘elevated to a definition’). Provided that one 
accepts a straightforward fact-convention or fact-definition distinction, the equivalence 
principle falls clearly on the side of the factual: The universality of free fall is an 
inductive generalisation from a set of empirical facts, and the equivalence principle is an 
interpretive extrapolation from the universality of free fall. If any principle were to be 
elevated, in Friedman’s sense, that principle would be the geodesic principle and not the 
equivalence principle. 
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4.3. An objection to taking the geodesic principle to be constitutive 
There is a possible line of objection to the idea that the geodesic principle is a 
constitutive principle. It might be pointed out that spinning bodies do not move according 
to the geodesic principle: 
 
It has long been recognized that spinning bodies for which tidal gravitational 
forces act on its elementary pieces deviate from geodesic behaviour. What this 
fact should clarify, if indeed clarification is needed, is that it is not simply in the 
nature of force-free bodies to move in a fashion consistent with the geodesic 
principle. (Brown, 2005, p. 141) 
 
But the fact that the geodesic principle is an idealisation—it is strictly satisfied only in the 
case of zero tidal forces—does not undermine the characterisation of the principle as a 
constitutive principle. In fact, the idealisation is essential. It is precisely this idealised 
conception of motion that is the basis for measuring geodesic deviation, which, in 
Einstein’s theory, can be understood in terms of components of rotation, expansion, and 
shear, given some congruence of geodesics. 
 
It is important to note that an idealised conception of geodesic motion is equally 
essential to Newtonian theory. The third law of motion asserts that the bodies comprising 
an isolated system—as well as the particles comprising a single body—will interact with 
each other so that the forces between them are balanced. In such a state of equilibrium, 
the centre of mass of the system will follow an approximately geodesic trajectory. The 
geodesic motion of the centre of mass of an isolated or ‘near enough’ isolated system is 
not a precise relativistic notion, but it is crucial to Newtonian reasoning: This state of 
motion is the basis from which perturbations can be measured. 
 
Newton’s method consists in beginning with idealised simple cases and moving to 
increasingly more complicated ones. In the case of bodies subject to inverse-square 
centripetal forces, Newton considers in Book I of Principia: one-body problems; two-
body problems, subject to the third law of motion; and problems of three or more 
interacting bodies, for which Newton obtains only limited, qualitative results. A 
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distinctive feature of this kind of reasoning is its focus on systematic deviations from 
Kepler’s laws. Smith writes: 
 
Newton is putting himself in a position to address the complexity of real orbital 
motion in a sequence of successive approximations, with each approximation an 
idealized motion and systematic deviations from it providing evidence for the next 
stage in the sequence. (Smith, 2002, p. 155) 
 
What the work of Smith and others clarifies is that the framework of the laws is the basis 
for a perturbative analysis of planetary systems. That is, the laws are not only a basis for 
determining the centre of mass of a quasi-isolated system but for reasoning from such a 
system to a larger system in which the quasi-isolated system is contained and in which 
systematic deviations from its ideal state of motion can be detected and measured. In both 
Newtonian and Einsteinian gravitation, therefore, the idealised conception of geodesic 
motion is the basis for the empirical measurability of the gravitational field. It is the basis 
for learning about the sources of the gravitational field in the Newtonian picture or for 
learning about curvature from the relative accelerations of geodesic trajectories in the 
Einsteinian one. 
 
5. The Kuhnian and Carnapian aspects of Friedman’s thesis 
In this final section, I wish to consider a further implication of Friedman’s view. 
While Friedman’s thesis is primarily motivated as an alternative to Quine’s naturalism, it 
is also a corrective to Kuhn’s account of the transition from Newtonian to Einsteinian 
gravitation. The transition from Newtonian to Einsteinian gravitation is the main example 
considered by Kuhn in Chapter IX of The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962 
[1970]), and Friedman sees in the logical empiricists’ approach to the analysis of physical 
theories a basis for correcting Kuhn. 
 
In The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962 [1970]), Kuhn introduced the idea 
of a scientific ‘paradigm,’ which he understood not merely as a set of theoretical 
principles but as an entire world-view consisting of metaphysical views, methodological 
rules, a conception of what constitutes a legitimate scientific question and what does not, 
and an understanding of what constitutes a scientific fact. Kuhn called the science 
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pursued within a paradigm ‘normal science.’ Normal science proceeds without any 
questioning of basic principles, and consists of puzzle solving, that is, answering 
questions set by the paradigm with standard methods. Periods of normal science are 
broken by periods of ‘revolutionary science,’ which are marked by an accumulation of 
unsolved puzzles, decreasing confidence in the reigning paradigm, and the appearance of 
alternative paradigms. Kuhn claimed that science progresses not cumulatively but by a 
succession of revolutions called ‘paradigm shifts.’ The main problem posed by this 
characterisation is this: How can one argue for and commit oneself to a new paradigm if, 
in periods of revolutionary science, the very criteria of factuality and scientific rationality 
are being challenged? Kuhn’s answer is that the argument for a new paradigm is 
necessarily circular: ‘Each group uses its own paradigm to argue in that paradigm’s 
defense.’ (Kuhn, 1962 [1970], p. 94) Paradigm shifts cannot therefore be the result of a 
rational process; a paradigm shift is ultimately a social or psychological phenomenon. 
Supposing that one accepts the problem and the response, Kuhn’s view can be understood 
to support relativism, though Kuhn himself did not endorse that consequence. 
 
Friedman’s thesis provides an alternative to Kuhn’s characterisation of 
revolutionary theory change. It is distinguished from Kuhn’s characterisation in two 
important respects: its transcendental character, and its replacement of a paradigm shift 
with a rational process of revision. By its transcendental character, I mean its 
employment of a method of analysis whose aim is to uncover the principles that interpret 
theoretical concepts by expressing criteria for their application, and so determine the 
framework of empirical investigation. It is the revision of these principles especially—
principles that make possible properly empirical hypotheses, with their associated 
ontological pictures, methodological rules, puzzles, standards of solution, and modes of 
community life—that represent revolutionary theory change. Friedman is concerned with 
the conceptual prerequisites for a theory capable of supporting a tradition of normal 
science. It would be a mistake therefore to regard the replacement of a set of constitutive 
principles as an explication of a paradigm shift, even though Kuhn (2000, pp. 104) 
regarded his own account as ‘Kantianism with movable categories.’ The replacement of 
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such a set completely replaces Kuhn’s idea in an altogether different account of our 
knowledge and its revision. 
 
It is important to note that, though I intend to criticise the scope of Friedman’s 
characterisation of a constitutive principle as well as his analyses of Newtonian and 
Einsteinian gravitation, his proposal that we should understand revolutionary theory 
change as the revision of constitutive principles is not undermined. This aspect of 
Friedman’s account remains even if one accepts my argument that a theory’s formal 
background is not constitutive. 
 
The second respect in which Friedman’s proposal differs from Kuhn’s concerns 
the process by which a set of constitutive principles is revised. This part of Friedman’s 
view is subject to the same problems as conventionalism. Friedman has a broadly 
Carnapian view of theory change and his view inherits something of Carnap’s 
conventionalism. Though Friedman acknowledges Einstein’s reinterpretation of free fall, 
he is more concerned with an external question about the adoption of a new framework 
than with Einstein’s insight within the old framework; but it is this insight that actually 
motivates the revision. DiSalle (2006b, p. 208) has observed that the question ‘do freely 
falling bodies follow space-time geodesics?’ is either an internal question about how 
geodesics are interpreted in Newtonian theory, in which case it is answered by a 
mathematical investigation, or an external question about the expediency of adopting a 
framework in which the trajectories of freely falling bodies are interpreted as geodesics. 
But, in the context of theory construction, there is no theory in which the trajectories of 
freely falling bodies are interpreted as geodesics. There is at most the framework of 
empirical investigation constituted by the geodesic principle—a framework that has yet to 
lead to the field equations, which, in turn, are a long way from being confirmed. That 
framework provides us, nonetheless, with a picture of motion, one in which we may ask, 
for example: What conditions are required for constructing a theory in which free fall 
trajectories are geodesics? What assumptions must be made about the form of such a 
theory for Newtonian gravitation to be recoverable in a certain regime? But, with only the 
external question of whether to adopt Newtonian or Einsteinian gravitation, no such 
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considerations enter into the account of theory change. As DiSalle has put it, ‘Carnap’s 
distinction ... does not comprehend the possibility of a conceptual analysis that discovers, 
within a given framework, the principle on which a radically new framework can be 
constructed.’ (DiSalle, 2006b, p. 208) In the absence of such a possibility, the mechanism 
of theory change lies in the decision to adopt a framework on the basis of expediency. 
 
Where Carnap’s account fails, Friedman’s account of the role of distinctly 
philosophical analysis at a meta-framework level is meant to be a solution. Friedman 
argues that this distinctly philosophical analysis in periods of fundamental conceptual 
revolution, in periods when the usual criteria of scientific rationality break down, 
involves another kind of rationality altogether. This ‘communicative rationality’ is 
characterised, roughly speaking, by a process of argument that appeals to patterns of 
argument acceptable to all participants, with a view to achieving agreement on what the 
constitutive principles of some domain are. It is opposed to ‘instrumental rationality,’ 
which is characterised as an individual process of deliberation in view of achieving some 
goal. It is the exercise of this form of rationality in both normal and revolutionary science 
that, for Friedman, typifies Kuhn’s failure to find permanent criteria and values across the 
development of science that enable paradigm shifts to be the result of a rational process. 
Friedman claims that it is the exercise of communicative rationality that permits 
agreement on a new framework when framework-dependent criteria of rationality are no 
longer of service. This is what effects theory change on Friedman’s account. 
 
Though Friedman’s account of theory change is a significant improvement over 
Kuhn’s, it is still reminiscent of conventionalism. Though it restores the idea that theory 
change is the result of a rational process and dispenses with mere expediency, the 
transition from the constitutive basis of Newtonian gravitation to that of Einsteinian 
gravitation amounts to a conventional choice—a choice achieved by the exercise of 
communicative rationality. In constrast with Kuhn, Carnap, and Friedman, a better and 
still more strictly empiricist account of revolutionary theory change is possible. The 
proper development and defence of this account is beyond the scope of this essay; see 
DiSalle (2002; 2006a; 2010) and Demopoulos (2010; 2011). But such a development and 
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defence must relocate the role of distinctly philosophical or conceptual analysis: It ought 
not to be understood as floating above the existing framework and a candidate-
framework, which somehow or other have come to be, but as situated in the existing 
framework, where its objects are those concepts whose interpretations are at issue. To 
return to the example of the transition from Newtonian to Einsteinian gravitation, the 
equivalence principle does not merely suggest that the 1905 inertial frame concept may 
not be the whole story; it undermines the determinateness of the concept definitively and 
irrevocably. And the consequent reinterpretation of inertial motion as movement along a 
geodesic that is summarised in the geodesic principle is not a side-effect or by-product of 
theory change but is itself constitutive of a new framework of investigation. On this 
understanding, the transition from Newtonian to Einsteinian gravitation is the outcome of 
a dialectical process that begins within the old framework and, through a rational process 
involving scientific and philosophical considerations, results in a new constitutive 
principle. 
 
Where Carnap’s account cannot comprehend the possibility of an argument for a 
new framework that has its origin in the old one, this account begins squarely within the 
old framework. And, by beginning within the old framework, Kuhn’s claim that 
defenders of different paradigms live in different worlds and so cannot argue with each 
other is undermined. 
 
6. Conclusion 
I set out to explicate and evaluate Friedman’s thesis. I began by considering 
Friedman’s charactersation of a constitutive principle as well as its antecedents in the 
work of Reichenbach and Carnap. I proposed that a constitutive principle be characterised 
as a principle that interprets a theoretical concept by expressing a criterion for its 
application. And, with this proposal, I argued that the scope of Friedman’s 
characterisation should be narrowed; specifically, that only those principles that have this 
function should be considered constitutive. 
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Another task was the evaluation of Friedman’s analysis of Einsteinian gravitation. 
I criticised his claim that the equivalence principle is a constitutive principle. I argued 
that the equivalence principle is not a constitutive principle but an empirical hypothesis 
that motivates a new constitutive principle, namely, the geodesic principle. Then I 
addressed the possible challenge that since free particles follow geodesics only 
approximately the idea that we should regard the geodesic principle as constitutive is 
undermined. 
 
The final task was to address the mechanism of theory change in Friedman’s 
view. Though, for Friedman, revolutionary theory change is the result of a process of 
rational revision and not a paradigm shift, I argued that his idea of a ‘change of 
constitutive principles’ is too close to a ‘change of conventions.’ It is more concerned 
with the external question of adopting a new framework than with the insight that 
motivates the revision. I proposed that the role of distinctly philosophical analysis be 
relocated: It must be situated within the old framework, where the argument for a new 
constitutive principle begins. In spite of these criticisms, I hope to have shown that 
Friedman’s thesis—at least so far as the methodological analysis of space-time theories is 
concerned—is eminently defensible. More generally, I aimed to clarify the sense in 
which Friedman’s thesis embraces the transcendental method of analysis without being 
committed to rescuing Kant’s philosophy. Essential to this method of analysis is the 
recognition that there is a stratification of our knowledge. The idea of a set of constitutive 
principles stands at some remove from Kant’s absolute ‘necessities of thought,’ but it is 
concerned nonetheless with the identification of those principles that secure our basic 
physical knowledge, that make it possible for objects of knowledge to be objects of 
knowledge. These principles do not have the same status as empirical hypotheses; they 
are prior to them in that they constitute the framework of empirical investigation, and so 
make genuine empirical hypotheses possible. This is the aspect of the logical-empiricist 
approach to the analysis of theories that Friedman seeks to rehabilitate, and that he urges 
against Quinean and post-Quinean thought. 
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Looking towards future work, Friedman’s thesis is intended to illuminate our 
analysis of revolutionary theory change not only in space-time physics but in physics and 
in the other exact sciences. Whether and to what extent this is possible is an open 
question, as Friedman himself (2001, pp. 117-129) acknowledges. This question is 
important not only for the further evaluation of Friedman’s thesis but, more importantly, 
for the continuing articulation and evaluation of the idea that Kant’s transcendental 
method is a ‘model of fruitful philosophical engagement with the sciences’ (Friedman, 
1992, p. xii). 
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Chapter 4 
 
On identifying background-structure in classical field theories† 
 
1. Introduction 
This essay examines the origin and extension of the concept of background-structure in 
classical field theories. The extension of the concept, before the recent work of Smolin 
(2006), Belot (2011), and others, was easily circumscribed. The concept denoted what is 
characteristic of the space-time structures of Newtonian theory and special relativity. 
 
Newton’s laws express criteria of causal interaction. They articulate an account in 
which the physical quantity force is the cause of the acceleration of mass. The content of 
the laws can be summarised as follows: Given a system of particles in motion, there 
exists a reference frame and a time-scale relative to which every acceleration is 
proportional to and in the direction of the force applied, and where every such force 
belongs to an action-reaction pair.53 Furthermore, given such a reference frame, forces 
and masses, accelerations and rotations have the same measured values whether that 
frame is at rest or in uniform translatory motion. In other words, the laws of motion 
satisfy the Galilei-Newton relativity principle. The equivalence-class structure 
determined by the invariance of the laws under the Galilean transformations is the 
structure of Newtonian space-time. 
 
From a retrospective point of view, the structure of the space-times of the 
Newtonian and special-relativistic frameworks can be equally well discussed in terms of 
the mathematical structures that their classes of inertial frames presuppose. In the 
Newtonian framework, those frames presuppose a global affine structure and separate 
metrical structures for space and time; in the special-relativistic one, they presuppose 
global affine and conformal structures and also the metrical structure of space-time. In 
both frameworks, these structures are fixed independently of the theories of special 
systems, and thus these structures do not evolve along with the special systems. To use a 
                                                
†A version of this chapter has been published in Philosophy of Science, 78(2011): 1070-81. The present 
version reflects further conversations on this topic with a number of people, especially Erik Curiel, Bill 
Demopoulos, Robert DiSalle, and Wayne Myrvold. 
53I owe this formulation to Thomson (1884, p. 387) and Muirhead (1887, pp. 479-480). 
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common figure, space and time are the ‘stage’ on which the ‘actors,’ namely, the physical 
fields, move. 
 
One of the great empirical claims of Einsteinian gravitation is that space-time 
structure is dynamical, and thus something to be discovered empirically. Einsteinian 
gravitation comprises affine, conformal, and metrical structures. But, in contradistinction 
to Newtonian theory and special relativity where those structures are necessary 
presuppositions of the classes of inertial frames, they are fixed only locally, and their 
variation over any finite region is determined by the distribution of mass-energy. This is 
not to say that everything in Einsteinian gravitation is dynamical, but, in this way and 
others, Einsteinian gravitation motivates the revision of the space-time structures of 
Newtonian theory and special relativity. Space and time cease to be a fixed stage and 
become actors. 
 
A number of physicists and philosophers of physics, notably Rovelli (2001; 
2004), Smolin (2006), and others pursuing loop quantum gravity, have seen in this 
empirical claim an insight about nature that ought to be preserved in a future theory. In 
their interpretation of the claim, they have fashioned a new concept that they call 
‘background-independence.’ This is the concept to be explicated, but, roughly speaking, 
to say that a physical theory is background-independent means that physical processes do 
not unfold against a spatio-temporal framework that is presupposed a priori but determine 
a dynamical framework in their evolution. This new concept figures in a new heuristic 
principle that they believe to be fruitful for those pursuing a quantum theory of space, 
time, and gravitation. Smolin states it as a maxim: ‘Seek to make progress by identifying 
the background structure in our theories and removing it, replacing it with relations which 
evolve subject to dynamical law.’ (2006, p. 204). The proper methodological analysis of 
such a heuristic principle is an outstanding philosophical project, one I hope to pursue in 
future work. 
 
In this chapter, I take up a prerequisite task. I ask: What is this background-
structure that Smolin would have us identify and remove? I propose and evaluate three 
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candidates for background-independence, and I argue that there is something chimaerical 
about the sought-after concept. My aim, however, is not solely critical and sceptical. I 
argue that there is a proposal for background-independence—one that stems from the 
work of Trautman, Anderson, and Friedman—that clarifies the particular feature of 
Einsteinian gravitation that is the basis for nearly all proposals for background-
independence. 
 
2. Background-independence and general covariance 
There is a sense in which the earliest discussion of background-structure is found 
in Newton’s criticism of Cartesian physics in De grav. But let us begin by getting clear 
on the kind and degree of background-independence exemplified in Einsteinian 
gravitation. 
 
Einstein took the first steps towards the account of motion characteristic of his 
gravitation theory in ‘On the Electrodynamics of Moving Bodies’ (1905 [1952b]). The 
Newtonian framework uncritically assumes that we have a way of determining whether 
spatially separated frames agree on which events are simultaneous. In the 1905 paper, 
Einstein argued that determining the time of occurrence of spatially separated events 
depends on a process of signalling. The invariance of the velocity of light—implicit in 
Maxwell’s theory and established empirically by Michelson, Morley, and others—
provided such a signal, and Einstein argued that a criterion involving emitted and 
reflected signals permits the derivation of the Lorentz transformations. This is the basis of 
Einstein’s special theory of relativity. One outcome of Einstein’s analysis of simultaneity 
was the replacement of the nineteenth-century inertial frame concept with the 1905 
inertial frame concept: An inertial frame is not merely one in uniform rectilinear motion 
but also one in which light travels equal distances in equal times in arbitrary directions. 
 
With the special theory of relativity, it was necessary to find a new theory of 
gravitation that would overcome the contradiction between the invariance of the velocity 
of light and the instantaneous action at a distance postulated by Newtonian gravitation. In 
1907, Einstein had an insight that has come to be called the equivalence principle. This is 
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the hypothesis that it is impossible to distinguish locally between a homogeneous 
gravitational field and a uniformly accelerated frame. The equivalence principle has as a 
consequence that matter obeys the same laws in a freely falling frame that it would in an 
inertial frame. In this consequence, Einstein began to recognise that freely falling motion 
and inertial motion are different presentations of the same motion. 
 
But there is a further step in Einstein’s argument: Einstein argued from the 
hypothesis that all bodies fall with the same acceleration in the same gravitational field to 
the stronger hypothesis that not only matter but light—and moreover, all physical 
processes—obey the same laws in a freely falling frame that they would in an inertial 
one. Without this extension, some phenomena, electromagnetic phenomena, e.g., would 
be a basis for measuring the acceleration of a freely falling particle relative to 
electromagnetically accelerated trajectories, namely, trajectories not determined by 
gravitation. This would be no different from our ability to measure the acceleration of an 
electron in an electromagnetic field relative to the inertial trajectory of a particle that is 
not affected by that field. This extension reflects what Will (1993, p. 68) has called the 
‘universal coupling’ of all non-gravitational fields to the gravitational field. If any 
phenomena failed to couple to gravitation in this way, they would indicate the existence 
of a ‘background-structure’ that is distinguishable from the gravitational field. As Will 
has put it, universal coupling allows us to ‘discuss the metric g as a property of space-
time itself rather than as a field over space-time’ (Will, 1993, p. 68). 
 
With his insight of 1907 and the crucial extension to all physical processes, 
Einstein recognised that freely falling motion and inertial motion are different 
presentations of the same motion. In this respect, the equivalence principle functions as a 
criterion for identifying inertial frames and freely falling ones. The identification of 
classical inertial frames and freely falling ones fatally undermines the determinateness of 
the 1905 inertial frame concept. That is, the concept fails to provide empirical criteria for 
identifying a unique state of motion as it was supposed to. With this identification, the 
fundamental distinction between inertial and non-inertial frames was collapsed, and the 
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relevant distinction became one between systems in free-fall and systems in non-free-fall 
motion. 
 
With the 1907 inertial frame concept, Einstein was faced with the question, how is 
the concept to be interpreted? Einstein’s chain of reasoning is the subject of debate, but 
there is a rational reconstruction of that reasoning that highlights the essential steps. 
Special relativity presupposes the mathematical structure of an affine space equipped 
with a Minkowski metric. In the special theory, the trajectories of bodies moving 
inertially and also those of light rays are interpreted as the straight lines or geodesics with 
respect to the Minkowski metric while gravitation is a force that pulls bodies off their 
straight-line trajectories. But Einstein, with much help from Grossmann, saw that 
Riemann’s newly-developed theory of manifolds offered an alternative to such an affine 
space for interpreting inertial trajectories: The inertial trajectories of freely falling 
particles can be interpreted as the geodesics with respect to a new metric that is 
determined by the distribution of mass and energy in the universe. This reinterpretation of 
free fall is summarised in what has been called the geodesic principle: Free massive 
point-particles traverse time-like geodesics.54 The geodesic principle interprets the 1907 
inertial frame concept by expressing a criterion for its application. It provides a 
framework of investigation in which one can begin to think about how to construct a 
theory where gravitation is represented as a manifestation of the curvature of space-time 
structure that is determined by the distribution of mass and energy. In this framework of 
investigation, Einstein realised that there is no way of smoothly laying down a global 
coordinate system and that the laws of his gravitation theory required a coordinate-
independent expression. He referred to that requirement as the principle of general 
covariance. 
 
With the geodesic principle and the requirement of general covariance with which 
Einstein connected it, no longer was there an equivalence class of preferred coordinate 
systems determined by the laws, and no longer were there non-dynamical affine, 
                                                
54The geodesic principle is stated in terms of point-particles because it holds only approximately for 
extended bodies. The geodesic principle for light rays may be stated: Light rays traverse light-like 
geodesics. 
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conformal, and metrical structures. Though Einstein did not use the term ‘background-
independence,’ he certainly appealed to the notion in his own characterisations of his 
gravitation theory. I will call that notion 
 
Proposal 1. A theory is background-independent just in case it satisfies the 
requirement of general covariance. 
 
But no sooner do we have this proposal in hand than we must respond to an objection: 
General covariance was trivialised nearly as soon as it was presented. In ‘The Foundation 
of the General Theory of Relativity’ (1916 [1952a]), Einstein gave an argument for 
general covariance that, following Stachel (1980), we now know as ‘the point-
coincidence argument.’ The locution ‘point-coincidence’ refers to the view that all 
physical observations consist in the determination of purely topological relations 
(coincidences) between objects of spatiotemporal perception. The argument runs as 
follows: (P1) All evidence for or against a physical theory rests on immediately verifiable 
facts. (P2) Immediately verifiable facts are exhausted by point-coincidences. (C) Thus, 
physical observations are reducible to point-coincidences. On this argument, any 
mapping that preserves point-coincidences preserves a theory’s physical content, and thus 
no coordinate system is privileged. 
 
Kretschmann (1917) brought to light an important physical implication of the 
point-coincidence argument that he took to trivialise general covariance. He thought that, 
if indeed a theory’s physical content is exhausted by point-coincidences, the equations of 
any theory can be made generally covariant without a modification of that content. 
Kretschmann’s challenge was taken seriously in the 1960s by Trautman, Anderson, 
Wheeler, Fock, and others, who learnt to distinguish the requirement of general 
covariance from the symmetries that equations of motion formulated in the Einsteinian 
framework admit. Henceforth, we will be discussing those symmetries and not the 
requirement of general covariance as understood by Einstein. 
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3. The Anderson-Friedman programme 
Anderson (1967) challenged the view that general covariance is the characteristic 
feature of Einsteinian gravitation, pointing out, as Kretschmann did, that any theory can 
be given a generally covariant formulation. He claimed that the characteristic feature of 
Einsteinian gravitation is its lack of an ‘absolute object.’ Anderson’s proposal was taken 
up by Friedman (1983), who sought to give it a more perspicuous formulation, and the 
following definitions are Friedman’s. To state the proposal properly, I will give an 
abstract sketch of a classical field theory. I will do so only in meanest outline and in a 
familiar notation. See Pitts (2006) for a technically and historically careful treatment of 
the Anderson-Friedman programme and the differences between Anderson’s and 
Friedman’s definitions. 
 
Let me represent the space-time of a classical field theory T as an ordered n-tuple 
of the form (M, O1, ..., On), where M is a smooth manifold and O1 , ... , On are geometric 
objects on M. Defining geometric objects is a non-trivial task, but, in general, the objects 
in question are tensors, tensor fields, and also metric-compatible connections. The 
dynamical laws of T will be built up out of these geometric objects. These laws have the 
form f(O1, ..., On) = 0. 
 
Let me turn now to the notion of an automorphic mapping of geometric objects on 
the manifold. If (M, φ1, ..., φn) and (M, θ1, ..., θn) are both models for T, then for every 
point p of M there is a mapping d of a neighbourhood A of p onto a neighbourhood B of p 
such that φi = d θi on A ∩ B. If that mapping is infinitely differentiable, one-to-one, onto, 
and has an infinitely differentiable inverse, then the mapping, denoted d, is called a 
diffeomorphism. The arbitrary diffeomorphisms d form a group, often denoted diff(M) as 
a reminder that they are automorphisms of M. Elements of diff(M) act on the geometric 
objects of the theory in question. 
 
With this framework in hand, let me return to the Anderson-Friedman proposal 
for characterising Einsteinian gravitation and other classical field theories. A geometric 
object Oi is an absolute object of T just in case for any two T-models (M, φ1, ..., φn) and 
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(M, θ1, ..., θn) φi and θi are invariant under diff(M). A geometric object that does not 
satisfy this definition is a dynamical object. 
 
Anderson’s distinction between absolute and dynamical objects is the basis of his 
definition of a theory’s symmetry group; namely, the largest subgroup of diff(M) that 
leaves invariant the theory’s absolute objects. It is noteworthy that, though Anderson 
defines a theory’s symmetry group in terms of that theory’s antecedently defined absolute 
objects, on an alternative understanding, the lack of absolute objects would be expressed 
by the lack of non-trivial symmetries. 
 
This definition is significant because it meets Kretschmann’s challenge: Theories 
may be reformulated so that their geometric objects are invariant under the actions of 
subgroups of diff(M) like the Poincaré group or so that they are invariant under diff(M) 
itself, even though, in their standard formulations, they would be invariant only under 
more limited mapping groups. It is precisely the further requirement expressed in the 
above definition that is supposed to distinguish a theory’s symmetry group from its 
mapping or covariance group. That requirement distinguishes Einsteinian gravitation, 
which Anderson claimed lacks an absolute object, from previous theories. 
 
4. Background-structure represented by geometric objects and beyond 
I have presented the definition of an absolute object not only to move beyond the 
trivialisation of general covariance but because Anderson took the presence of absolute 
objects in a theory’s equations to imply that theory’s commitment to a certain form of 
‘background-structure,’ though he himself did not use that term. Thus, the Anderson-
Friedman definition provides us with another strategy for identifying background-
independence, which I will call 
 
Proposal 2. A theory is background-independent just in case it has no absolute 
objects. 
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With this proposal, the notion of background is entirely determined by the geometric 
objects on a manifold.55 
 
As with proposal 1, no sooner do we have this proposal in hand than we must 
respond to a line of objection, namely, that the Anderson-Friedman distinction between 
absolute and dynamical objects cannot capture the intended and essentially physical 
distinction. Geroch (reported in Friedman, 1983, p. 59, n. 9) pointed out that even in 
Einsteinian gravitation one might draw up a scenario in which geometric objects like 
nowhere-vanishing vector fields and symplectic forms count as absolute objects. He 
made his point with the following example. Suppose we have a cosmological model in 
which there is omnipresent dust, all particles of which are at rest in some Lorentz frame. 
Pressure-free dust has the stress-energy tensor Tab = ρUaUb, where the density of the dust 
particles ρ is defined as the number of particles per unit volume in the unique inertial 
frame in which the particles are at rest and Ua is the four-velocity. In such a universe, the 
four-velocity would be nowhere-vanishing, and would count as an absolute object on 
Friedman’s definition. That is, there would be a background reference frame in the 
imaginary model, the rest frame of the dust. Torretti (1984, p. 285) offered another 
counterexample to the Anderson-Friedman distinction. He formulated a theory of 
modified Newtonian mechanics in which each model has a space of constant non-positive 
curvature, but different models have different values of curvature. He pointed out that 
such curvature is undeniably a kind of background-structure, yet escapes the Anderson-
Friedman definition of absoluteness. Pitts (2006) presents and challenges these and other 
counterexamples, and he offers a defence of the Anderson-Friedman programme. But he 
concedes that Einsteinian gravitation may have an absolute object, namely, the scalar 
                                                
55There is a discussion that I would like to acknowledge, if only briefly. Though Anderson did not 
introduce absolute and dynamical objects with reference to action principles, he certainly regarded 
dynamical objects as variational, while absolute objects are not (1967, 88-89). Some (e.g., Hiskes, 1984) 
have seen in this another way of drawing the absolute-dynamical distinction: No object that is varied in a 
theory’s action principle should be considered absolute. But others (e.g., Rosen, 1966; Sorkin, 2002) have 
argued that a flat metric can be derived from an action principle by introducing geometric objects that vary 
in the required way. It is significant that Anderson himself (1967, p. 83) headed off this line of objection by 
proscribing what he called ‘irrelevant variables.’ Anderson was concerned with the essentially physical 
distinction between space-time structure in Newtonian theory and special relativity, on the one hand, and 
Einsteinian gravitation, on the other. For him, that distinction was never a merely formal one, and he was at 
pains to defend it from those who would undermine it with formal ‘tricks.’ 
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density obtained by reducing the metric into a conformal metric density and a scalar 
density.56 
 
Some may consider these counterexamples to be reason enough for giving up 
proposal 2. But Trautman (1966; 1973) hints at another way of thinking about physical 
theories, one that Pitts does not consider in his defence.57 This work suggests that the 
space-times of Newtonian theory and special relativity are characterised by absolute 
objects; the space-time of Einsteinian gravitation is characterised by dynamical ones.58 
That is to say, theories of special systems formulated in the Newtonian or special-
relativistic frameworks presuppose geometric objects that determine a fixed metric affine 
geometry; those of systems formulated in the framework of Einsteinian gravitation 
depend on geometric objects that determine a dynamical one. On this interpretation, there 
is no suggestion that Einsteinian gravitation lacks an absolute object. The distinction 
between Anderson’s and Friedman’s accounts, on the one hand, and Trautman’s, on the 
other, is not merely verbal. The claim that the metric affine geometry of Einsteinian 
gravitation is characterised by dynamical objects is importantly different from the claim 
that Einsteinian gravitation has no absolute objects. In this way, the line of objection 
motivated by the counterexamples and a debate over the viability of the Anderson-
Friedman programme is better avoided. This way of characterising physical theories can 
also be used to motivate another proposal for background-independence; we might call it 
proposal 2a: A theory is background-independent just in case its metric affine geometry is 
characterised by dynamical objects. This proposal helps preserve something of the 
intended and essentially physical distinction that motivated the distinction between 
absolute and dynamical objects. 
 
Nonetheless, there is a line of objection that undermines both proposals 2 and 2a 
in a different way. These proposals commit us to the view that whether a theory is 
                                                
56See Pitts (2006, pp. 366-367) for details. 
57In fact, the notions of absolute and dynamical objects are due to Trautman. But it was Anderson and 
Friedman who gave them a perspicuous formulation. For this reason, Anderson and Friedman are more 
readily associated with them than Trautman. 
58Passages supportive of this reading can be found in Trautman (1973), though the claim that Einsteinian 
gravitation has no absolute object can also be found in Trautman (1966). In any case, I will attribute this 
reading to Trautman. 
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background-independent depends on its geometric objects. But Belot (2011, pp. 12-20) 
has recently pointed out that the concept of background-independence admits of degrees. 
He considers, among other examples, the vacuum solutions to Einstein’s field equations 
that give rise to de Sitter, anti-de Sitter, and Minkowski space-times. These and other 
solutions have the asymptotic behaviour of one of the spaces of constant curvature. 
 
To take another family of examples in Einsteinian gravitation, suppose one 
attaches a boundary to a four-dimensional manifold.59 Suppose, further, that one builds 
into the kinematically possible configurations of a theory’s geometric objects not only 
such requirements as smoothness and global hyperbolicity but also the requirement that 
space-time is approximately Minkowskian as one approaches the boundary.60 Such a 
theory will have no geometric objects that determine a background, but such a theory will 
admit diff(M) only locally, not generally; at the boundary, the theory will admit only a 
subgroup of diff(M). The theory will lie between paradigmatically background-dependent 
theories in which geometric objects propagate in Minkowski space-time and 
paradigmatically background-independent theories such as spatially compact Einsteinian 
gravitation. So, even though the theory has no geometric objects that determine a 
background-structure, the boundary conditions ensure that any solution has the structure 
of a Minkowskian background at spatial infinity. 
 
With these sorts of situations in mind, Belot proposes an elegant scheme for 
fixing the extension of background-structure.61 No longer is background-independence an 
all or nothing affair; theories are shown to have degrees of background-independence. To 
make precise various degrees of background-(in)dependence, Belot introduces a 
distinction between a theory’s geometrical and physical degrees of freedom. The 
geometrical degrees of freedom are represented by the geometric objects, figuring in the 
dynamical laws of a theory, that parametrise the equivalence classes of space-time 
geometries. The physical degrees of freedom are represented by the geometric objects 
that parametrise the quotient-space obtained by identifying gauge-equivalent solutions. A 
                                                
59For details on attaching various kinds of boundaries, see, e.g., Hawking and Ellis (1973). 
60I owe this family of examples to Belot (2011). 
61The following is only a sketch of Belot’s proposal; see Belot (2011) for details. 
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theory is then said to be fully background-dependent just in case it has no geometrical 
degrees of freedom, and fully background-independent just in case its geometrical and 
physical degrees of freedom match. Of greater moment, however, is the possibility of 
characterising theories of ambiguous background-structure. A theory is said to be nearly 
background-dependent if it has only finitely many geometrical degrees of freedom and 
nearly background-independent if it has a finite number of non-geometrical degrees of 
freedom. In this way, proposals 2 and 2a are recovered and situated in a larger space of 
possibilities in which their uniqueness is undermined.62 
 
Belot’s proposal is a significant contribution. But, as much as it clarifies the idea 
that there are various degrees of background-independence, it also sharpens the 
ambiguity of the concept. Provided that a theory has no absolute objects, does 
background-independence require (i) that a theory presuppose nothing about global 
structure or (ii) that a theory preclude the possibility of such structure? For Einsteinian 
gravitation could be said to satisfy neither (i) nor (ii) since the theory holds that geometry 
is everywhere locally Lorentzian, making Belot’s proposal trivially true, or Einsteinian 
gravitation could be said to satisfy only (i) in that geometry is dependent on the 
distribution of mass and energy. Though I leave aside the question of the methodological 
status of a principle like Smolin’s for future work, this particular ambiguity already 
suggests a reason to avoid asserting a meta-principle about eliminating background-
structure. 
 
Belot’s proposal also provides an opportunity to comment on the distinction 
between local and global structure in Einsteinian gravitation. Einsteinian gravitation 
departs from Newtonian theory and special relativity in that it places weaker a priori 
restrictions on global structure; to put the point in Carnapian terms, global geometry is 
relegated to the P-rules of the framework. But that departure, though radical, does not 
stem from a philosophical or methodological motivation to construct a theory with that 
                                                
62Belot’s proposal represents a significant advance over the work of Trautman, Anderson, and Friedman, 
but it is noteworthy that the idea that geometric objects parametrise a theory’s degrees of freedom is 
already there in Trautman (1966, p. 322). 
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characteristic but from the fact that the equivalence principle motivates a purely local 
definition of a geodesic. 
 
5. Further beyond geometric objects 
To this point, I have only considered some of the strongest mathematical 
structures that may be imposed on a manifold; namely, metrics and other geometric 
objects both absolute and dynamical. I have considered certain solutions to the field 
equations and also the imposition of asymptotic boundary conditions from which 
background-structure may arise. In contrast, Trautman (1973), Thorne, Lee, and 
Lightman (1973), Smolin (2006), and others have pointed out that one may count 
dimension, topological and differential structure, temporal orientation, and even the 
metric signature as background-structures, though they leave it as an open question 
whether these lower levels of background-structure are essential to all physical theories 
or whether they may be replaced by a future theory. In this vein, one might ask, why use 
the real numbers as opposed to some other field? And, taking this still further, one might 
well ask whether all the mathematical structures a theory ‘quantifies over’ are to be 
considered background-structures. Though I take the suggestion of Trautman and others 
seriously, it reinforces that there is something chimaerical about background-
independence: No sooner have we cut off one head than two more spring up to take its 
place; no sooner do we seem to be getting a hold of the concept when it slips away again. 
In any case, it is noteworthy that Einsteinian gravitation presupposes these lower-level 
features, yet allows for scenarios in which certain of these features are violated by (e.g.) 
singularities. 
 
How, then, are we to fix the extension of background-independence so as to 
include those kinds of background-structures that escape a proposal such as Belot’s? 
There is an intuition that seems to underlie the views of Smolin (2006), Giulini (2007), 
Belot (2011), and others. And, though I do not do full justice to their views, I will 
summarise it in what I call 
 
Proposal 3. A theory is background-independent just in case it has no fixed 
‘stage’ that shapes the evolution of the fields without itself being shaped by them. 
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This proposal is very nearly the so-called action-reaction principle: For something to be 
physical it cannot act without being acted upon. That principle, Einstein claimed, is 
satisfied by his gravitation theory and not by Newtonian theory or special relativity. And 
the idea certainly lies behind Anderson’s definition of an absolute object. I will not 
address here Einstein’s view that space-time should not act without being acted upon. 
Nor will I address the bearing of the action-reaction principle on discussions of 
background-independence. But it is important to note that the action-reaction principle 
seems to loom behind nearly all proposals for fixing the extension of background-
independence. 
 
A metaphor by Novalis—‘Theories are nets: only he who casts will catch’—is 
particularly apt for the evaluation of proposal 3. The main objection to proposal 3 is that 
it is a step too far; it is a catch-all for virtually any kind of mathematics used in the 
formulation of a theory. All of the above proposals are subsumed, but room is left for 
other conceptions of background-structure. It may be that some still finer-grained 
classification is possible, but I will not attempt that here. I only want to point out that, by 
catching everything, proposal 3 blurs even the line between the language required for 
saying anything at all and interpreted mathematical theories. Where that line is drawn 
varies from theory to theory, and it is not drawn a priori or by some philosophical or 
methodological demand such as (e.g.) the demand that a theory be background-
independent. Rather, it is a set of empirical criteria—the laws of motion, a criterion for 
identifying time of occurrence, the geodesic principle—that controls the application of 
some or another body of mathematical theory. In Einsteinian gravitation, for instance, one 
needs an empirical reason to consider certain solutions to the field equations as physical 
possibilities or to impose asymptotic boundary conditions, and, in view of that, one might 
not want to formulate the theory or a meta-theoretical principle about the theory so that 
certain solutions or the imposition of boundary conditions is precluded a priori. At the 
very least, an important strength of proposals 2 and 2a over proposal 3—or any proposal 
motivated by the action-reaction principle or something like it—is that it does not 
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dissolve the important differentiation of background-structures into a ‘night in which all 
cows are black.’ 
 
If proposal 3 is a step too far, what, if anything, remains to be said about 
proposals 2 and 2a? I have presented the case against these proposals: I have charged 
them with failing to account for kinds of background-structures that are not determined 
by the geometric objects on a manifold. To be sure, the analysis of the concept of 
background-structure cannot end with proposals 2 and 2a. But the net cast by Trautman, 
Anderson, and Friedman was a good one. It is a virtue of proposal 2a that it illuminates a 
central feature of Einsteinian gravitation: The Einsteinian framework does not presuppose 
certain global structures, though it does not preclude them. It does not preclude, for 
example, that we might want to study bounded systems like stars, and so investigate 
space-times that are asymptotically flat. That one can formulate and study scenarios such 
as those identified by Geroch and Belot does not diminish that proposal’s isolation of the 
difference between theories formulated in a Newtonian or special-relativistic framework, 
on the one hand, and certain theories formulated in the framework of Einsteinian 
gravitation, on the other. In this way, that proposal sharpens—and does not blur—the 
feature of Einsteinian gravitation that is the basis for nearly all proposals for background-
independence. 
 
With a clearer understanding of the empirical motivation for a dynamical 
geometry, we might attempt to express Smolin’s methodological principle more 
reasonably. We might formulate it: ‘Find out whether there are background-structures 
that cannot be empirically motivated and eliminate them.’ But this principle, too, reflects 
no philosophical insight peculiar to Einsteinian gravitation. In the absence of some 
particular empirical motivation for applying or eliminating a given mathematical 
structure, it reflects only the standard empiricist’s application of Ockham’s razor—and it 
could apply not only to background-structures, understood in terms of absolute objects, 
but also to dynamical objects if they have no empirical motivation. By criticising 
Smolin’s principle, I do not mean to suggest that no meta-principles play or have played a 
heuristic role in theory construction. But what is revealed in Einstein’s own construction 
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of his theories, and in his provision of empirical criteria that articulate theoretical 
concepts, is that methodological analysis promises a clearer understanding than meta-
principles of what constraints are imposed by our present understanding of gravitation on 
future theories. 
 
6. Conclusions and a further consideration 
With each of my proposals, I have tried to identify a genuine candidate for 
background-independence. There is a sense in which the requirement of general 
covariance is a candidate for background-independence. But Kretschmann showed that 
theories that are not generally covariant in their standard formulations may be 
reformulated, a point that the Anderson-Friedman programme masterfully addressed. I 
argued next that there is an important sense in which a theory that has no absolute 
objects—or whose metric affine geometry is characterised by a dynamical object—is a 
candidate for background-independence. But the challenges to proposals 2 and 2a, from 
several directions, seemed to suggest that this strategy could not capture important 
conceptions of background-structure. This motivated proposal 3. That proposal captures 
too much, and I suggested that one might want to distinguish between different kinds of 
background-structures; namely, those arising from certain solutions to Einstein’s field 
equations, from the imposition of boundary conditions, and from lower levels of 
background-structure. In this regard, Belot’s proposal is significant for its clarification of 
the sense in which even a theory whose metric affine geometry is characterised by a 
dynamical object can still have various degrees of background-independence. But Belot’s 
proposal also draws attention to the more basic question of what is demanded by the 
concept of background-independence. I have suggested that, though Belot’s analysis 
provides an important explication, it says nothing about whether the concept requires that 
a theory presuppose nothing about global structure or that a theory preclude the 
possibility of such structure. The empirical interest of studying certain isolated systems in 
Einsteinian gravitation, e.g., would appear to be a good reason not to preclude the 
possibility of such structure a priori. We are left, then, with only the weaker demand that 
a theory presuppose nothing about global structure—at least so far as we set aside 
questions about lower-level background-structures like topological and differential 
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structures, the metric signature, and others. This is the sense that the programme of 
Trautman, Anderson, and Friedman succeeds in capturing. So, though there is something 
chimaerical about background-independence, there is also a sense in which the feature of 
Einsteinian gravitation that motivated all of the proposals is aptly captured by that 
programme. 
 
There is a further consideration with which I would like to conclude. I set out by 
recalling the fundamental insight into the nature of the gravitational interaction that is 
summarised in the equivalence principle. I recalled that the equivalence principle 
motivated a new inertial frame concept, and that the geodesic principle expresses a 
criterion for the application of that concept. 
 
The equivalence principle that I have discussed has been called ‘Einstein’s 
equivalence principle,’ which is itself an interpretive extrapolation of the universality of 
free fall. Einsteinian gravitation is not the only theory that satisfies this equivalence 
principle; Newtonian theory satisfies it too. Anderson (1967), Ehlers (1973), and others 
have shown that Einsteinian gravitation also satisfies another principle. This has been 
called ‘the principle of minimal coupling,’ according to which no terms of the special-
relativistic equations of motion contain the Riemann curvature tensor. In this way, 
minimal coupling ensures that special relativity is a local approximation so long as tidal 
gravitational effects can be ignored. Not only does Einsteinian gravitation satisfy this 
stronger demand; it is essential for ensuring the local validity of special relativity. The 
conjunction of Einstein’s equivalence principle and minimal coupling amounts to what 
has been called ‘the strong equivalence principle.’63 The strong principle implies that no 
more than the dynamical metric gab is needed to account for gravitation. 
 
This stronger principle bears directly on the question of background-independence 
because a modification of Einsteinian gravitation like the Brans-Dicke theory, which 
                                                
63Note that the strong equivalence principle is more commonly presented as the conjuction of the principle 
of the universality of free fall, which grounds Einstein’s equivalence principle and is in this sense more 
fundamental, and the principle of minimal coupling. (See, for example, Anderson (1967), Ehlers (1973), 
and Will (1993).) I have discussed Einstein’s equivalence principle throughout because its role in the 
argument for the 1907 inertial frame concept is more immediate. 
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comprises absolute and dynamical objects, fails to satisfy it. The exclusion of the Brans-
Dicke theory and others by the strong equivalence principle serves to isolate, in yet 
another way, what is distinctive about Einsteinian gravitation. Here the strong 
equivalence principle is playing the same role as proposal 2 in excluding those theories 
that comprise absolute objects. In this way, the strong equivalence principle further 
clarifies the sense in which Einsteinian gravitation is background-independent, whether 
or not the concept is of any service as a heuristic. 
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Chapter 5 
 
Conclusion 
 
In each of the essays, I have addressed the proper methodological analysis of inertial 
frames in the conceptual framework of physics. By way of conclusion, I would like to 
consider the notion of apriority that figures, in one way or another, in each of the essays. 
  
5.1. The a priori and the foundations of space-time theories 
There are two senses of ‘a priori’ that arise in the essays. The first sense is found in 
‘There is no conspiracy’ and ‘On identifying background-structure.’ This sense concerns 
the legitimacy of accepting a physical theory that asserts the possibility of global space-
time structures. 
 
This line of enquiry looks both backwards and forwards. Looking backwards, 
Brown claims that there is something questionable about Newtonian theory and special 
relativity because they assert the possibility of global inertial frames, along with the 
geometric objects required for their representation. This view is driven by arguments that 
are not exclusively or even primarily empirical. Looking forwards, Smolin and others are 
concerned with the questions: Can there be any a priori demand on a future theory? Is 
eliminating ‘background-structure,’ however this term is understood, a fruitful heuristic 
in the pursuit of a quantum theory of space, time, and gravitation? 
 
In both of these essays, I argued that the offending non-dynamical background-
structures—those characteristic of Newtonian theory and special relativity and 
supposedly explained away by Einsteinian gravitation—are not the result of an a priori 
postulation. To be sure, there are geometric objects that are invariant in all models of 
Newtonian theory and special relativity. But the criteria that control the application of 
these geometric objects are derived from experience. In the absence of an empirical 
criterion for identifying classical inertial frames and freely falling ones, therefore, the 
alleged illegitimacy of the global inertial frames of Newtonian theory and special 
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relativity amounts to no more than the expression of a meta-theoretical or metaphysical 
preference for a certain kind of theory. 
 
The main motivation of the conspiracy of inertia and of the proposals for 
background-independence appears to stem from a certain approach to the analysis of 
physical theories. This may consist of taking certain metaphysical or meta-theoretical 
principles to be satisfied by Einsteinian gravitation. It may consist of taking certain 
features of Einsteinian gravitation and holding them to be insights about nature that future 
theories must satisfy. In either case, it amounts to elevating certain ideas to the status of 
standards according to which both older theories—Newtonian theory and special 
relativity—and new research programmes—approaches to quantum gravity—are 
evaluated. At first glance, the tremendous empirical success of Einsteinian gravitation 
could appear to justify such an elevation. That elevation could be regarded as fulfilling 
the empiricist demand that experience should make a rational contribution to our 
knowledge of the world.64 But, whatever the precise motivation of the conspiracy 
allegation and of the proposals for background-independence, this approach to the 
analysis of theories finds defects in the global inertial frames of Newtonian theory and 
special relativity where in fact there are none. This approach, while seemingly motivated 
by a commitment to empiricism, is driven by a set of metaphysical and methodological 
intuitions that go beyond empiricism’s basic demand. 
 
The second sense of ‘a priori’ arises in ‘Friedman’s Thesis.’ The characterisation 
of a constitutive principle I have defended stands at some remove from Kant’s. Their 
relation is one of analogy: Kant’s constitutive principles apply the categories of the 
understanding to possible experience; constitutive principles, in the sense I have 
defended, interpret theoretical concepts by expressing criteria for their application. So, 
though these principles may be called ‘constitutive principles’ in analogy with Kant’s 
principles, the principles in question are not a priori at all. They are prior only to the 
properly empirical hypotheses that they make possible. Furthermore, constitutive 
                                                
64I owe this characterisation of the empiricist thesis to Gupta (2006). 
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principles must be distanced from principles that are true in virtue of their meanings, in 
virtue of convention or stipulation. 
 
The notion of a constitutive principle also figures in Kant’s analysis of Newtonian 
physics. Kant saw in Newton’s theory not only a revolutionary scientific discovery but a 
revolutionary philosophical advance. He saw in Newton’s theory a basis for criticising 
the preceding Leibnizian tradition in which notions of space, time, force, motion, 
substance, and causality are applied to the ‘intelligible’ world of monads. He held that 
these metaphysical notions have no content at all except through their ‘sensible’ 
counterparts, and he took the laws of motion to provide the only framework in which the 
sensible notions can be extended to the universe at large. 
 
While Kant was mistaken in thinking that Newtonian physics is the unique such 
framework, the idea that certain theories provide a general framework in which to 
construct theories of specific interactions captures a central feature of modern theoretical 
physics. Newtonian theory, special relativity, and Einsteinian gravitation are all what 
might be called ‘framework-theories.’65 That is to say, they all provide frameworks of 
constraints in which physical quantities can be constructed and whose evolution can be 
determined. As Einstein has put it, they are based on ‘general characteristics of natural 
processes, principles from which mathematically formulated criteria are developed, 
which the various processes or the theoretical representations of them have to satisfy’ 
(Einstein, 1919 [2002], p. 213). These theories must be presupposed for further 
theorising; namely, for the construction of theories of special systems, the theory of a 
point-particle or that of a perfect fluid, for example. So, while the spatio-temporal 
frameworks given by Newtonian theory, special relativity, and Einsteinian gravitation are 
not a priori in any Kantian sense, they are prior in this special sense. Nonetheless, the 
presupposition of these spatio-temporal frameworks does not preclude the possibility that 
some new theory will motivate their replacement. Einstein appreciated this and noted 
their foundation in empirical generalisations. 
                                                
65The notion of a framework-theory can be prised from Einstein’s (1919 [2002]) notion of a principle-
theory. For details, see Flores (1999) and DiSalle (2006; 2012) who have argued convincingly for this 
interpretation. 
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Regarding Newtonian theory, special relativity, and Einsteinian gravitation as 
framework-theories in this sense reinforces that, in spite of the significant differences in 
their accounts of space-time structure, they are theories of the same kind. From this point 
of view, the accounts I have considered in ‘There is no conspiracy’ and ‘On identifying 
background-structure,’ distinguish artificially between Newtonian theory and special 
relativity, on the one hand, and Einsteinian gravitation, on the other. I hope to have 
shown that, though Einstein’s geometrisation of gravitation was a significant advance, the 
distinctions between conspiratorial theories and non-conspiratorial theories, background-
dependent theories and background-independent theories, do not arise from inherent 
differences among the theories but from a meta-theoretical or metaphysical basis. The 
Newtonian and special-relativistic inertial frame concepts, and the geometric objects 
whose representation they require, are not asserted a priori but are tied to empirical 
criteria; namely, the laws of motion, and a criterion for identifying time of occurrence. In 
the same way, the inertial frame concept peculiar to Einsteinian gravitation is tied to an 
empirical criterion, in this case a criterion for identifying two previously distinct kinds of 
motions. 
 
5.2. Future work: The proper methodological analysis of the equivalence principle 
While these essays have examined the Newtonian and 1905 inertial frame 
concepts and the critical analysis that was motivated by the equivalence principle, there is 
still more to say about the methodological analysis of the principle. This represents a 
natural extension of this project. 
 
The equivalence principle as a criterion of identity 
Most work on the equivalence principle has focused on challenges that arise in the 
formulation of a statement of the principle and on the proper understanding of its scope of 
applicability (e.g., Pauli, 1921 [1958]; Anderson & Gautreau, 1969). Other work focuses 
on conceptual tangles that the principle supposedly raises (e.g., Eddington, 1923; Synge, 
1960 [1971]; Ohanian, 1977; Norton, 1985). Still other work (Okon & Callendar, 2011) 
examines the equivalence principle with an eye to quantum theory. 
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This work is important. But it largely neglects the methodological analysis of the 
equivalence principle. A methodological analysis must consider two basic questions: 
What kind of principle is the equivalence principle? What is its role in the conceptual 
framework of gravitation theory? Part of the reason why a proper methodological 
analysis has not been pursued is because the equivalence principle has been characterised 
as a mere heuristic. We find such a view in Synge (1960 [1971], pp. ix-x), along with a 
dismissal: ‘I have never been able to understand this principle .... The principle performed 
the essential office of midwife at the birth of general relativity .... I suggest that the 
midwife be now buried with appropriate honours.’ In this way it has been relegated to 
part of the motivational basis for Einstein’s construction of his gravitation theory. It is 
thought to have motivated Einstein’s construction of his theory in much the same way 
Mach’s principle did. But, while it did motivate the construction of a new gravitation 
theory, its role is not ambiguous in the way that Mach’s principle was; its role was 
decisive. 
 
The methodological function of the equivalence principle in the conceptual 
framework of physics appears in each essay. In ‘Friedman’s Thesis,’ I addressed the 
principle directly. (In ‘There is no conspiracy’ and ‘On identifying background-
structure,’ I was concerned with the equivalence principle insofar as it is part of the basis 
that motivates the application of a geometry of variable curvature to the world of 
experience.) Friedman’s analysis consists of answers to the questions: What kind of 
principle is the equivalence principle? What is its role in the conceptual framework of 
physics? But, while I am sympathetic to Friedman’s approach to the analysis of physical 
theories, my main task in ‘Friedman’s Thesis’ is critical. 
 
In future work, I would like to develop a positive account of the equivalence 
principle. The idea I want to develop further is that the equivalence principle is not about 
equivalence—in the sense of proportionality or behavioural indistinguishability—at all 
but about the recognition that two previously distinct concepts of motion are identical. 
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The idea to be developed further is that the equivalence principle is properly understood 
as a criterion of identity. 
 
The notion of a criterion of identity has its origin in Frege (1884 [1980]), who 
made it the cornerstone of his theory of number. Frege sought to provide an analysis of 
the nature of arithmetic by showing that the theory of the natural numbers can be derived 
from a principle that has the same scope and generality as conceptual thought itself. This 
principle has the form: ‘For any concepts F and G, the number of Fs is the same as the 
number of Gs if, and only if, there is a one-to-one correspondence between the Fs and the 
Gs.’ (Demopoulos, 2013, p. 19) Frege introduced this principle as a criterion for 
assessing the conditions under which we should judge that the same number has been 
presented to us in two different ways as the number of two different concepts. In the 
context of second-order logic, Frege’s criterion of identity implies the Peano-Dedekind 
axioms. But its role does not end there: The criterion also governs our judgements of 
equinumerosity in our applications of the theory of natural numbers; for example, in our 
everyday application of the theory of the natural numbers in counting. 
 
Demopoulos (2013) has argued that the notion of a criterion of identity has a role 
to play in the methodological analysis of the exact sciences well beyond the one it plays 
in Frege’s theory. Frege’s notion of a criterion of identity can form the basis for a new 
account of the application of mathematical theories: Just as Frege showed that his 
criterion of identity for number governs our application of the theory of the natural 
numbers in counting, other criteria of identity govern the application of other 
mathematical theories; among them, Euclidean and Minkowskian geometry. 
 
I want to show that the equivalence principle consists in the provision of a 
criterion for identifying the motion of a classical inertial frame with that of locally freely 
falling one. Furthermore, the provision of this criterion of identity is part of the basis that 
governs the application of the geometry of variable curvature in Einsteinian gravitation. 
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By developing this new account of the equivalence principle, I hope to deepen our 
understanding of the foundations of Einsteinian gravitation. But the account is also of 
more general importance to the history and philosophy of science. It offers a more 
nuanced and preferable alternative to two prominent accounts of scientific theory change, 
namely, Kuhn’s (1962 [1970]) and the conventionalists’ (e.g., Reichenbach, 1928 [1958]; 
Carnap, 1934 [1951]). These accounts have no better mechanisms to explain the 
transition from the 1905 inertial frame concept to the 1907 concept than the problematic 
notions of a Kuhnian paradigm shift and a change of conventions. On my account, this 
transition emerges as the result of an analysis, which avoids the pitfalls of Kuhn and 
conventionalism. Still another contribution of my account is that it substantiates the idea 
that criteria of identity have a wider role to play in methodological analysis. 
 
The distinctive feature of Einstein’s contribution 
Having addressed the methodological status of the equivalence principle, I will 
isolate Einstein’s distinctive contribution to our understanding of it. Isolating that 
contribution is important because the idea that inertial frames and freely falling frames 
are indistinguishable was in fact anticipated by Newton. Newton points out in Corollary 
VI to the laws of motion that if bodies moving with respect to one another are influenced 
by uniform accelerative forces along parallel lines they will move with respect to one 
another in the same way they would if they were not influenced by those forces. In other 
words, matter obeys the same laws in a freely falling frame that it would in an inertial 
frame. 
 
The significance of Corollary VI is a subject of debate in the post-Einsteinian 
context. To begin with, it is controversial what the significance of Corollary VI is for the 
correct mathematical setting of Newtonian theory. Saunders (2013) claims that when 
Corollary VI is properly understood Newton’s theory requires a mathematical setting 
different from those previously proposed. Saunders’ claim is surprising; it goes against 
received wisdom about the correct mathematical setting of Newtonian theory. I want to 
evaluate Saunders’ claim and compare his mathematical setting of the theory with a few 
of the usual candidates, including Galilean space-time, Maxwellian space-time, and 
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geometrised Newtonian gravitation. Secondly, I want to argue that, though Corollary VI 
establishes that inertial motion and freely falling motion are indistinguishable, its 
function is not to identify them; that is, Corollary VI is not a criterion of identity. One 
could say that Newton failed to recognise freely falling frames and inertial frames as 
different presentations of the same concept. But, given his own theoretical framework, 
Newton was correct to think that freely falling frames and inertial frames are only 
equivalent to the degree that the freely falling system is very far from the source of the 
gravitational field, and so the lines of uniform acceleration are very nearly parallel; that 
is, to the degree that inhomogeneities in the gravitational fields external to the system in 
question are negligible. Newton demands only a ‘near enough’ isolated system for the 
sake of getting a ‘near enough’ measure of the forces at work within the system. 
 
This work will contribute to the foundations of both Newton’s and Einstein’s 
gravitation theories. Identifying the correct mathematical setting is essential for correctly 
understanding Newtonian theory. By challenging the misconception that the main insight 
of the equivalence principle was already there in Corollary VI, this work will clarify what 
is distinctive about Einstein’s contribution. Corollary VI and the 1907 equivalence 
principle are two interpretations, within different frameworks, of the same fundamental 
fact about the behaviour of bodies in gravitational fields. 
 
The methodological status of background-independence 
In ‘On identifying background-structure,’ I asked: What is the background-
structure that Smolin would have us identify and remove? I took up the task of 
identifying three candidates for background-independence, and I argued that background-
independence is something of a chimaera: No sooner do we seem to be getting a hold on 
the concept than it slips away again. 
 
In future work, I want to examine the methodological status of Smolin’s new 
heuristic principle: ‘Seek to make progress by identifying the background-structure in our 
theories and removing it.’ (Smolin, 2006, p. 204) Smolin’s commitment to that principle 
is motivated by a number of metaphysical principles that he regards as genuine insights 
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about nature, and that he takes to be satisfied by Einstein’s gravitation theory. One 
example of such a principle is the relationist thesis of Leibniz (1715-16 [1970]) and Mach 
(1883 [1919]), according to which space and time are not real entities but an abstraction 
from the geometrical relations among bodies. Another is Leibniz’s action-reaction 
principle. I think it is important to show that, whatever the heuristic value of such 
principles in theory construction, Einsteinian gravitation, at least, owes little or nothing to 
them. Take, for example, the relationist thesis, which Leibniz intended as a criticism of 
Newton’s theory. The thesis fails doubly: It fails as a criticism of Newton’s theory 
precisely because Leibniz did not postulate a kind of background-structure that Newton 
showed to be essential for the construction of an empirically adequate theory of motion; 
and it fails because the analogy commonly drawn between Leibniz’s account of motion 
and Einsteinian gravitation is a bad one. In another line of argument, I want to show that 
there is something peculiar about Einstein’s geometrisation of gravity. Although that 
geometrisation was an empirically well-motivated move in the construction of his 
gravitation theory—one closely knit to the equivalence principle—there is not an equally 
clear motivation to formulate the particular character of that theory as a much more 
general kind of methodological principle. 
 
This continuation of my work on background-independence aims to further 
undermine the concept. But its contribution is not uniquely negative: It will illuminate 
what is distinctive about Einstein’s geometrisation of gravitation. More generally, this 
work is of importance because it exposes an old and persistent pattern of reasoning about 
theories, one that gives undue importance to purely philosophical principles that are 
alleged to motivate genuine physical insights. In this respect, my work urges a stricter 
empiricism. 
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Appendix A 
 
Formulating a principle of momentum conservation 
in Newtonian mechanics and special relativity 
 
 
In this appendix, I review how to formulate a principle of conservation of momentum for 
a Newtonian or a special-relativistic system. This way of developing the conservation 
SULQFLSOHFDQEHIRXQGLQPRVWHOHPHQWDU\PHFKDQLFVWH[WV,KDYHIROORZHG.QLJKW¶V
Physics (San Francisco: Addison Wesley, 2004). 
 
Consider a system of N particles. Identify each particle by a number k. Every 
particle interacts with every other particle via action-reaction pairs of forces. 
Furthermore, every particle may be subject to forces from outside the system. 
 
Define the total momentum P of the system as the vector sum: 
۾ ൌ ܘଵ ൅ ܘଶ ൅ ܘଷ ൅ڮ൅ܘ௡ ൌ ෍ܘ௡Ǥ
ே
௞ୀଵ
 
 
The time derivative of P tells us how the total momentum of the system changes: 
 
۾
 ൌ෍
ܘ௞
 ൌ ෍۴௞Ǥ
௞௞
 
 
The net force acting on particle k can be divided into interaction forces within the system 
and external forces: 
۴௞ ൌ ෍۴௝୭୬௞
௝ஷ௞
൅۴௘௫௧୭୬௞Ǥ 
 
(Note that the restriction j ് k expresses the fact that particle k does not exert a force on 
itself.) Now we can formulate the rate of change of the total momentum P of the system: 
 
۾
 ൌ ෍෍۴௝୭୬௞
௝ஷ௞
൅
௞
෍۴௘௫௧୭୬௞
௞
Ǥ 
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The double sum adds the interaction forces within the system. But because of the third 
law ۴௞୭୬௝ ൌ െ۴௝୭୬௞ and ۴௞୭୬௝ ൅۴௝୭୬௞ ൌ ͲǤ Thus, the sum of all the interaction 
forces is 0. That is to say, they form an equilibrating set. Therefore, the above equation 
becomes 
۾
 ൌ ෍۴௘௫௧୭୬௞ ൌ ۴௡௘௧Ǥ
௞
 
 
Here, ۴௡௘௧ is the net force exerted on the system from without. Note that this is just the 
second law written for the system as a whole; that is, the rate of change of the total 
momentum of the whole is equal to the net force applied to the whole system. 
 
 For an isolated system, the above equation becomes 
 
۾
 ൌ ͲǤ 
 
In this way, we obtain a statement of the principle of conservation of momentum. But 
note that this is just another way of expressing the principle of inertia. 
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Appendix B 
 
The notion of a constitutive principle in Helmholtz and Poincaré 
 
While the laws of motion are the paradigm-example of a set of constitutive principles, 
examples can be found elsewhere in physics. Helmholtz’s principles that lie at the basis 
of the geometries of constant curvature are also examples of constitutive principles. 
Helmholtz’s principles originate in his analysis (1868 [1977a]; 1868 [1977b]; 1869 
[1977c]) of Kant’s theory of spatial intuition, according to which the Euclidean character 
of space is reflected in our ability to carry out the straightedge-and-compass constructions 
in Elements. Helmholtz recognised that the fundamental notions underlying these 
constructions are congruence and straightness, and he asked whether they have an 
empirical origin. The fruit of this analysis is his reply that our idea of space is neither 
innate nor a transcendental form of intuition but arises from our experiences of bodily 
motion and vision. 
 
We learn through bodily motion that our bodies are not deformed as we move 
through space. That is, we infer it from the fact that there are no sensations specifically 
related to movement. From this experience, and from our experience with rigid bodies, 
we form a conception of the structure of space that is grounded in the study of 
displacements. The group of displacements that we discover in this way is summarised in 
the principle of free mobility: A rigid body may undergo arbitrary continuous motions 
without change of shape or dimension. The principle is constitutive of our concept of 
congruence, and so is one of the conceptual prerequisites for carrying out straightedge-
and-compass constructions and, more generally, for making a measurement of length 
using a pair of dividers, a measuring rod or a chain. 
 
We learn by reaching for objects in our visual field and by shielding our eyes 
from light that we can make certain judgements of direction and distance, and in this way 
we learn that the paths of light rays may be treated as straight lines. This is summarised in 
the principle of the straight-line propagation of light: The path of a light ray, inferred 
from our experience with lines of sight, may be treated as a straight line. The principle 
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controls the application of the Euclidean concept of straightness; it expresses an empirical 
criterion by which straightness can be determined.66 It is noteworthy that this does not 
imply that people without sight cannot have a concept of straightness; what perhaps they 
cannot have is the Kantian intuition of the construction of straight lines in visual 
imagination. 
 
Helmholtz’s analysis revealed that these principles control the application of 
Euclidean geometry. But his analysis revealed something further: The principle of free 
mobility is enough67 to derive the Euclidean form of the metric.68 The metric derivable 
from free mobility, however, admits three different isometry groups, that compatible with 
Euclidean geometry and also those compatible with the geometries of constant positive 
and negative curvature. The principle of free mobility restricts the mathematically 
possible spaces—all those compatible with a Riemannian manifold—to those of constant 
curvature. What is remarkable is that Helmholtz’s analysis reveals that the same 
principle, free mobility, underlies both our intuitive conception of space and the 
mathematical conception of a class of metrical spaces. 
 
With this important result, the question arises: Which of the three geometries of 
constant curvature is the correct geometry for the space of experience? Helmholtz replied 
that Euclidean geometry is singled out by our investigation of the behaviour of rigid 
bodies and our subsequent discovery that measurements are found to satisfy the axioms 
of Euclidean geometry. 
 
The nature of Helmholtz’s principles was further clarified by Poincaré (1902 
[1952]). For both Poincaré and Helmholtz, the principle of free mobility and the principle 
of the straight-line propagation of light are constitutive of the geometries of constant 
                                                
66Helmholtz argued that we can nonetheless imagine that space is non-Euclidean by picturing light rays that 
behave like the straight lines of a non-Euclidean space, that is, by imagining what visual sensations we 
would have. He even went so far as to suggest how we might create such sensations using lenses. 
67It is unsurprising for this reason that the principle of free mobility figures much more prominently than 
the principle of straight-line propagation in Helmholtz’s account. 
68This result was only sketched by Helmholtz; it was proved by Lie in his theory of continuous groups. For 
this reason, the result is generally referred to as the Helmholtz-Lie theorem. See Stein (1977) and Torretti 
(1978) for details. 
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curvature. But, while Helmholtz held that Euclidean geometry is singled out by our 
investigation of the behaviour of rigid bodies and by our measurement of the angles of 
triangles, Poincaré disagreed. Poincaré held that, though experience furnishes us with the 
idea of a group of free motions, experience does not single out one of the three 
geometries of constant curvature. For him, there is no fact of the matter about which of 
the three geometries is the actual space of experience. If, however, we want to construct a 
dynamical theory, we must stipulate one of the geometries as a background; and, since 
the laws of such a theory will be simplest on a Euclidean background, Poincaré held that 
it would always be preferred. 
 
The difference between Helmholtz’s and Poincaré’s views hinges on their 
analyses of the status of the principles; specifically, on the question whether they express 
facts or definitions. That there is a problem in holding the principle of free mobility to be 
an empirical fact was recognised by Helmholtz, who saw that free rigid motion and 
congruence are interdefinable: ‘we have no criterion for the fixity of bodies and spatial 
structures other than that when applied to one another at any time, in any place and after 
any rotation, they always show the same congruences as before’ (Helmholtz, 1868 
[1977a], p. 24). With this recognition, one might say that for Helmholtz, then, the real 
empirical fact is the existence of a set of relatively rigid bodies, since, like Poincaré, he 
also appreciated that actual rigidity is an idealisation. But only in the work of Poincaré 
was the problem made explicit and resolved. While, for Helmholtz, the principle of free 
mobility and the principle of the straight-line propagation of light are the empirical ‘facts 
in perception,’ for Poincaré, they are ‘definitions in disguise’: The invariance of certain 
bodies under free motions is not a fact about those bodies but a definition of congruence; 
the straight-line propagation of light rays is not a fact about light but the definition of a 
straight line. Poincaré’s philosophical contribution consists therefore in a correction; 
namely, in the recognition that Helmholtz had mistaken definitions for empirical 
hypotheses. 
 
As in the case of Newton’s laws, Helmholtz’s principles are constitutive in the 
sense that they interpret the concepts of congruence, rigidity, and straightness by 
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expressing criteria for their application. In this way, the principles control the application 
of the geometries of constant curvature. 
 
Another example of a set of constitutive principles is found in Maxwell’s 
equations. Maxwell’s equations, like the laws of motion, appear to inform us about 
theoretical concepts that in fact they define and interpret for us. Much as in the 
Newtonian context, the basic materials of Maxwell’s theory were already known pre-
systematically from experience with permanent magnets and charged objects, from the 
discoveries of Oersted, Ampère, Faraday, and many others. But they remained only a 
piecemeal collection of facts and rules of thumb until Maxwell synthesised and 
reinterpreted them to construct a coherent system of scientific knowledge. Maxwell’s 
equations constitute the concepts of electric field and magnetic field by expressing 
criteria for their application; they determine a framework of empirical investigation in 
which the relevant quantities can be detected and measured. Smith (2010) points out, for 
example, that the Ampère-Maxwell law is presupposed to a high degree of precision 
every time current is measured using a galvanometer of whatever sort. 
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